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Interpreting the 1981 Amendments to the Illinois
Bank Holding Company Act
Ray H. Greenblatt*
INTRODUCTION

On July 3, 1981, Governor Thompson signed Public Law 82-21,1
amending the Illinois Bank Holding Company Act of 1957' (the
"1957 Act") to permit bank holding companies commencing January 1, 1982, to acquire multiple banking subsidiaries in Illinois.
Basically, the amended statute (the "1981 Act") permits a bank
holding company to acquire an unlimited number of banks in Illinois subject to two limitations: first, a bank chartered after January 1, 1982 may not be acquired until it has engaged in the banking business for at least ten years;' and second, the main banking
premises of all banks in Illinois acquired by a bank holding company after January 1, 1982 must be located in the holding company's statutory home region and not more than one contiguous
region of the five banking regions into which the 1981 Act divides
the state.
This article will explore the manner in which the 1981 amendments will change Illinois bank holding company law and examine
a number of questions raised by the 1981 Act. The article will then
analyze the impact the 1981 Act is likely to have on antitrust considerations affecting the assessment of bank acquisitions in Illinois.
THE NONCOMMERCIAL BANK

Unlike the 1957 Act, which defines "bank" to mean any bank in
Illinois organized under the national banking laws or the laws of
* Member of the Illinois Bar. Partner, Mayer, Brown & Platt, Chicago, Illinois.
1. The Bank Holding Company Act Amendments of 1981, P.A. 82-21, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch.
17, 7 2501-13 (Smith-Hurd, 1981). The Act is effective January 1, 1982.
2. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 161/2,
71-76 (1979). The 1957 Act, as amended by the 1981
amendments, has been renumbered and transferred to chapter 17 in the Smith-Hurd Illinois
Annotated Statutes. Citations to the current version of the Act, effective January 1, 1982,
will be to the 1981 Smith-Hurd Illinois Annotated Statutes. Citations to superseded or repealed portions of the Act will be to the 1979 Illinois Revised Statutes.
3. Section 3.05 of the 1981 Act, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 17, 7 2508 (Smith-Hurd, 1981).
4. Section 3.04 of the 1981 Act, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 17, 1 2507 (Smith-Hurd, 1981).
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Illinois, 5 the 1981 Act 6 defines "bank" in a manner substantially
identical to the Federal Bank Holding Company Act (the "Federal
Act").7 More specifically, the 1981 Act defines "bank" to mean any
national or state bank, wherever organized, which "(1) accepts deposits that the depositor has a legal right to withdraw on demand
by check or other negotiable order and (2) engages in the business
of making commercial loans."
This changed definition of "bank" could be very significant. A
bank organized under national or state banking laws which accepts
deposits but does not "engage in the business of making commercial loans" is not a "bank" for purpose of the 1981 Act. A bank
which restricts its lending operations to consumer loans, residential
mortgage loans and loans to charitable entities would be such an
institution.9 Neither the geographical limitation on holding company expansion (home region plus one contiguous region) nor the
prohibition against acquiring de novo or recently-chartered banks
applies to the acquisition of banking entities not engaged in the
business of making commercial loans. Thus, a bank holding company, whether or not based in Illinois, can presumably acquire
such banking entities anywhere in the state and can form them de
novo, provided, of course, that it can obtain Federal Reserve Board
approval for such acquisitions. 10

5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 162, 72 (1979).
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 17, 2502(a) (Smith-Hurd, 1981).
12 U.S.C. § 1841(c) (1976).
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 17, 1 2502(a) (Smith-Hurd, 1981).
The Federal Reserve Board has confirmed that a bank which restricts its lending
activities to loans for personal, family, household and charitable purposes would
not be a "bank" within the meaning of § 2(c) of the Federal Act. 12 U.S.C. §
1841(c). Correspondence from (i) James McAfee, Assistant Secretary of the Board
of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, to Robert C. Zimmer, Counsel to
Associates First Capital Corporation. (March 11, 1981); (ii) Neal L. Peterson, General Counsel, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, to Joshua M.
Berman, Counsel to The Boston Company, Inc. (May 19, 1978); (iii) Michael A.
Greenspan, Assistant Secretary of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System, to Lee J. Aubrey, Vice President, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston (May
18, 1972); and (iv) Kenneth A. Kenyon, Deputy Secretary, Board of Governors of
the Federal Reserve System, to Biaggio M. Maggiacomo, President, Greater Providence Deposit Corporation (July 1, 1971). The foregoing correspondence is on file
with the Loyola University of Chicago Law Journal.
10. Indeed, by reason of the closely similar definition of "bank" in the Federal Act, such
bank holding company could, subject to Federal Reserve Board approval, acquire noncommercial banks anywhere in the United States without running afoul of the Federal Act's
"Douglas-Amendment" limitation on interstate bank acquisitions not expressly permitted
by the law of the state where the target bank is located. 12 U.S.C. § 1842(d)(1) (1976). An
application for Board approval of the acquisition of a noncommercial bank would be made
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Moreover, if the 1981 Act is construed in accordance with federal
precedent, an ineligible target bank can be transformed into an eligible "nonbank" by a disposition of its commercial loan portfolio

prior to acquisition. Under substantially identical language in the
Federal Act, companies have been permitted to acquire deposittaking banks without registering as bank holding companies or obtaining Federal Reserve approval to control such banks, if prior to

such acquisition the bank divests its commercial loan portfolio and
does not thereafter engage in the business of making commercial
loans.1 1

under § 4(c)(8) of the Federal Act relating to nonbank activities, 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(8),
rather than § 3 relating to acquisitions of banks, 12 U.S.C. § 1842. Although the Board has
confirmed that companies which are not bank holding companies may acquire noncommercial banks without becoming bank holding companies subject to the Federal Act, see note 11
infra and accompanying text, the Board has not yet had occasion to rule on a bank holding
company application to acquire a noncommercial bank. It is clear that a noncommercial
bank's activities would be "closely related to banking", thereby satisfying part of the §
4(c)(8) requirement that the activities in question be "so closely related to banking . . . as
to be a proper incident thereto." Section 4(c)(8), however, also requires that the Board, "in
determining whether a particular activity is a proper incident to banking. . . shall consider
whether its performance by an affiliate of a holding company can reasonably be expected to
produce benefits to the public ... that outweigh possible adverse effects." Even though the
activities of a noncommercial bank would be "closely related to banking", therefore, the
Board would have power under § 4(c)(8) to deny an application on the ground that such
activities are not a "proper incident" to banking. See, e.g., Federal Reserve Board orders
denying acquisitions by American Fletcher Corporation of Southwest Savings and Loan Association, 60 Fed. Res. Bull. 868 (1974), and by Memphis Trust Co. of Homeowners Savings
and Loan Association, 61 Fed. Res. Bull. 327 (1974). In the American Fletcher and Memphis Trust cases, the Board, after finding savings and loan activities to be "closely related to
banking", denied the bank holding company's application to acquire a savings and loan association on the ground that, at least under the circumstances prevailing in 1974 and 1975,
bank holding company entry into the savings and loan business would not satisfy the
"proper incident" test. The issue of bank holding company acquisition of thrift institutions
was reopened in 1981 when, at the request of Congress, the Board commenced a study of the
potential effects of such acquisitions. FRB Request for Comments, March 16, 1981. CCH
FED. BANKING L. REP., 1 98,649 (Mar. 27, 1981).
11. Correspondence from James McAfee, Assistant Secretary of the Board of Governors
of the Federal Reserve System, to Robert C. Zimmer, Counsel to Associates First Capital
Corporation ("Associates"), a subsidiary of Gulf & Western Corporation, and to Thomas F.
Bolger, President, Independent Bankers Association of America, regarding acquisition of
Fidelity National Bank, Concord, California, by Associates (March 11, 1981)(on file with
Loyola University of Chicago Law Journal). See also "Household Target Sells Commercial
Loan Portfolio," American Banker, August 21, 1981, regarding, in addition to the foregoing
transaction, the acquisition of Rainier National Bank, Seattle, Washington, by Household
Finance Corp., and a proposed acquisition of California Bancorp Inc. by Avco Corp.;
"Parker Pen Affiliate Buys Small New Hampshire Bank," American Banker, October 30,
1981, regarding the acquisition of Citizen's National Bank, Tilton, New Hampshire, by a
subsidiary of the Parker Pen Co.
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THE LIMITATION ON ACQUISITIONS OF NEW BANKS-ECEPTION FOR
BANKS CHARTERED BEFORE EFFECTIVE DATE

Section 3.05 of the 1981 Act provides that a bank chartered after
January 1, 1982, cannot be acquired unless it has engaged in the
banking business for at least ten years."2 Although this limitation
essentially forecloses expansion through formation of de novo
banks, it relates only to banks in Illinois chartered after January 1,
1982. A bank chartered prior to that date need not have engaged in
the banking business for any prescribed period in order to be eligible for acquisition. Thus, a bank chartered prior to January 1,
1982, can be lawfully acquired under the 1981 Act even though it
has been engaged in the banking business for less than ten years.
Indeed, the exclusion permitting acquisition of a bank chartered
prior to January 1, 1982, is not conditioned on any requirement
that the bank engage in the banking business prior to that date or
to the acquisition date. Does the 1981 Act permit a bank holding
company, which has caused a de novo bank in Illinois to be
chartered by friendly organizers on or before January 1, 1982, to
acquire and commence the operations of such bank after January
1, 1982?
The answer to this question may depend on interpretation of the
1957 Act, which continues in effect until January 1, 1982, the effective date of the 1981 Act. The 1957 Act, through its prohibition of
multibank holding companies, prevents a company from acquiring
12.

Section 3.05 provides:
Subject to the provisions of Section 3.06 of this Act, on or after the effective
date of this amendatory Act enacted by the 82nd General Assembly, no company
may acquire, directly or indirectly, a bank in Illinois chartered after the effective
date of this amendatory Act enacted by the 82nd General Assembly until such
bank has engaged in the banking business for at least ten years. A bank in Illinois
shall not be deemed to have been acquired, for purposes of this Section, if such
acquisition is made through a reorganizaton which results in the transfer of control of a single bank in Illinois to a company formed to effect such reorganization
pursuant to a tender offer by such company for the shares of such bank in Illinois,
or pursuant to a merger or consolidation of such bank in Illinois with a bank in
Illinois formed as a subsidiary of such company to effect the reorganization, if the
shareholders of such company, and their respective percentage shareholdings, immediately following such reorganization are substantially identical to the shareholders, and their respective percentage shareholdings, of such bank in Illinois
immediately before the reorganization except to the extent shareholders of such
bank in Illinois holding .voting shares thereof outstanding immediately before such
reorganization do not as a result of such reorganizaton become shareholders of
such company either by reasons of not accepting such tender offer or of exercising
statutory rights to dissent from any such merger or consolidation.

ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 17, 1 2508 (Smith-Hurd, 1981).
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control of more than one bank in Illinois.' s More specifically, the
1957 Act prohibits "bank holding companies," which it defines to
include any company "which directly or indirectly owns or controls
15 per centum or more of the voting shares of each of two or more
banks." 4 The 1957 Act's definition of "bank" is broad enough to
include a bank which has not yet commenced business. 5
The critical issue is whether a company which causes a bank to
be chartered prior to January 1, 1982, but does not acquire the
bank's shares until after that date, "indirectly owns or controls"
the bank's voting shares during the interim period. Although the
company would presumably not have direct voting power during
this period, its relationship with the friendly organizers and its
agreements or understanding to acquire the bank from them after
January 1, 1982, might be deemed indirect ownership or control.
Language in a recent Federal Reserve Board decision approving
a bank holding company application suggests that the Illinois
Commissioner of Banks and Trust Companies has concluded that
the acquiring company would not, prior to consummation of the
acquisition in 1982, "indirectly own or control" the shares of the
newly-chartered bank and, therefore, would not be in violation of
the 1957 Act during the interim period. In Arlington Bancorp,
Inc.," the Federal Reserve Board approved an application under
the Federal Act regarding a series of related transactions pursuant
to which Suburban, a de novo bank in Illinois, would be organized
prior to January 1, 1982, as a national bank. At least 80% of the
shares of Suburban would be acquired by Arlington, a new company which, subsequent to January 1, 1982, would issue up to
14.9% of its voting shares to each of seven other companies. Each
of the seven companies-all controlled by a single individual and
his immediate family-already controlled an existing bank in
Illinois.
The Federal Reserve Board noted that the applicants had "committed," in accordance with the "advice" of the Illinois Commissioner: first, to organize Suburban prior to January 1, 1982, in order to avoid the restrictions in the 1981 Act on the acquisition of

13. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 161/2,73 (1979).
14. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 161/, 172-73 (1979).
15. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 161/2, 72 (1979). The definition of "bank" in § 2(a) of the 1981
Act appears different in this regard. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 17, $ 2502(a) (Smith-Hurd, 1981).
See text accompanying notes 6-9 infra.
16. Arlington Bancorp, Inc., et al., Federal Reserve Board Order, dated August 19, 1981,
approving formation and acquisition of shares of bank holding company.
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banks chartered after that date, and second, to delay consummation of the acquisition of the Arlington shares by the other seven
bank holding companies until after that date "to avoid any possible violation. .. [of the 1957 Act's] prohibition against multibank
holding companies.117 This "advice" regarding the proposed acqui-

sition suggests that the Commissioner doubted whether the 14.9%
limitation on the share interest in Arlington to be acquired by
each of the seven existing bank holding companies would insulate
the acquisition of Arlington from the 1957 Act's prohibition on
multibank holding companies. The 1957 Act, like the Federal Act,
defines "company" to include a partnership, joint venture or similar organization,1 ' and the Commissioner was obviously concerned
that the seven existing bank holding companies acting in concert
with each other and with the controlling individual would together
constitute a multibank holding company in the nature of a partnership, joint venture or similar organization.19
Thus, the Commissioner appears to have taken the position that
even if the seven existing bank holding companies, together with
the controlling individual, would be a multibank holding company
upon their acquisition of the Arlington shares, if the acquisition
did not occur prior to January 1, 1982, such group would not become a bank holding company for purposes of the 1957 Act during
the interim period. The Commissioner reached this conclusion although principals of the group were to be the bank's organizers
and plans were firm for the acquisition to go forward after the effective date of the 1981 Act.

17.

Id. at 3, n.2 of the Board's Order.

ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 16V,
72 (1979).
19. Indeed, the Federal Reserve Board noted that, in a similar instance, it had found a
group of bank holding companies acting together to acquire the shares of a bank holding
company to be a "company" and a "bank holding company" within the meaning of the
Federal Act. The Federal Act defines "company" in substantially the same terms as the
1957 Act. 12 U.S.C. § 1841(b) (1976). The Board observed that the record in connection with
the Arlington application also "could support a finding that the seven bank holding companies. .. are together a 'company' that would become a 'bank holding company' upon consummation of the transaction," but concluded that no legulatory purpose under the Federal
Act would be served by requiring the group to register as a bank holding company under the
Federal Act, in view of the group's intention to reorganize as a multibank holding company
after the effective date of the 1981 Act. The Illinois Commissioner, however, did not have
the latitude to make a similar concession, since the question of whether the group would be
a multibank holding company during the interim period was the basic issue under the 1957
Act.
18.

1981]

Illinois Bank Holding CoL Act

.INTERPRETIVE QUESTIONS REGARDING LIMITATIONS ON ACQUISITIONS
OF BANKS CHARTERED AFTER JANUARY 1, 1982

Can a Company Previously Unaffiliated with Banking Make a
Direct Acquisition of a De Novo Bank or Banks in Operation
for Less Than Ten Years?
The section 3.05 prohibition against acquiring banks in Illinois
which have not been engaged in the banking business for at least
ten years applies to acquisitions by any "company," whether or not
at the time of such acquisition it is already a bank holding company by reason of its control over another bank. Section 3.05 excepts from this prohibition transactions in which a holding company specially created for the purpose acquires control of a bank
pursuant to a phantom bank reorganization 0 or tender offer in
which the bank's shareholders, other than those who dissent or do
not tender, become shareholders of the holding company. There is
no other exception permitting a "company" to acquire a bank
which has not operated for the prescribed period, and "company"
as defined in the 1981 Act includes "any corporation, business
trust, voting trust, association, partnership, joint venture or similar
organization" as well as certain other trusts.2 '
Literally construed, section 3.05 would require individuals forming a bank de novo or acquiring an existing bank in operation for
less than ten years, who desire to hold the shares of such bank
through a corporation, partnership, trust or other "company," first
to purchase the shares of such bank as individuals, and then to
transfer the shares to the desired "company" in a tender offer or
phantom bank reorganization permitted by the language of the exception. Moreover, literally construed, the 1981 Act may prohibit
such individuals from formalizing any partnership, voting trust or
similar arrangement among themselves prior to such tender offer
or phantom bank reorganization; otherwise, a prohibited acquisition by a "company" may be deemed to have occurred.2
20. A phantom bank reorganization is a reorganization pursuant to which a new, nonoperating bank (called a "phantom" or "interim" bank) is chartered as a subsidiary of an
existing or newly-formed corporation solely for purposes of combining with an existing, operating bank through a merger, pursuant to which the corporation emerges as the holder of
all the outstanding stock of the bank surviving the merger, and the shareholders of the
preexisting operating bank receive shares of the corporation in substitution for their shares
of the preexisting bank.
21. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 17, 2502(c) (Smith-Hurd, 1981).
22. See definition of "company" in ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 17, 1 2502 (Smith-Hurd, 1981).
See also note 19 supra and note 62 infra.
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It is unlikely that the Illinois legislature intended to prohibit a
company in no way affiliated with a bank or bank holding company
from directly acquiring a bank in Illinois formed de novo or in operation less than ten years, at least if such company does not, at
the time of such acquisition, and cannot until such bank has been
in operation for ten years, acquire any other banks in Illinois. Failure to limit the prohibition on "company" acquisitions of recentlychartered banks could unnecessarily complicate the formation and
acquisition of new banking enterprises by those not previously in
the banking business. To avoid all risk, a lawyer may be driven to
structure the acquisition as one by individuals (and companies no
one of which will acquire a "control" position) and subsequently
transfer ownership to a holding company through a tender offer or
phantom bank reorganization.
It remains to be seen whether this unintended statutory overkill
can be ameliorated through regulatory and judicial interpretation.
Meanwhile, the lawyer must make a judgment in structuring such
a transaction. If the lawyer concludes that a company theretofore
totally uninvolved in banking may directly acquire a bank less
than ten years old without violating the 1981 Act (at least if it is
committed not to acquire additional banks until its subsidiary
bank has been engaged in banking for ten years), the Federal Reserve may also have to be convinced of the soundness of this conclusion in order to register the company under the Federal Act. It
is not inconceivable that the Federal Reserve would look to the
Illinois Commissioner or Attorney General for an interpretation.
Can a Bank Holding Company Not Eligible to Be Acquired
Because It Controls a Recently-Chartered Bank Acquire an
Eligible Bank Holding Company?
Section 3.05 permits a bank chartered after January 1, 1982, and
not yet eligible for acquisition (an "ineligible bank") to create its
own holding company. The 1981 Act is silent as to whether a bank
holding company formed to control an ineligible bank could acquire control of one or more banks which were chartered prior to
the effective date or which have been in operation for at least ten
years ("eligible banks"). If the eligible banks are subsidiaries of a
single bank holding company, that company would be prohibited
by section 3.05 from acquiring the ineligible bank or its holding
company. However, the 1981 Act does not expressly prohibit the
parent of the ineligible bank from acquiring the parent of the eligi-
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ble bank. 3
If an eligible bank or its holding company causes the formation
of an ineligible bank and its holding company, a court might well
hold a proposed acquisition of the eligible by the ineligible holding
company to be an unlawful attempt to circumvent the prohibition
on acquisition of a recently-chartered bank. Even if the eligible
bank does not cause the formation of the ineligible bank, a determination that the nominal acquiree is in fact the acquirer could
invalidate the acquisition. For example, if a small holding company
absorbs through merger a large holding company, and the shareholders of the large company emerge from the transaction as the
controlling shareholders of the resulting corporation, a bank regulator or court would probably view the nominal acquiree to be in
fact the acquirer. Absent a showing that the eligible bank or its
holding company is in fact the acquirer, or that it caused the acquirer to be created, the acquisition of eligible banks or their holding companies by a holding company lawfully controlling an ineligible bank may not be precluded by the 1981 Act. 4
If a Bank Receives a New Charter in a Charter Conversion or
Phantom-Bank Conversion to Holding Company Form, Will it
be Deemed for Purposes of the 1981 Act to have been Chartered
on the Date of the Abandoned Charter or of the New Charter?
If an eligible bank converts from a national to a state bank or
from a state to a national bank, it will receive a new charter.2"
Under section 3.05, does it continue to be a bank eligible to be
acquired at any time or does it become ineligible until it engages in
banking for ten years from the date of its new charter? Clearly the
Illinois General Assembly did not intend a charter conversion to
transform an eligible bank into an ineligible bank. Undoubtedly
the bank regulators and courts, applying a "tacking" approach, will
consider the bank to have been chartered as of the date of the
23. This assumes, of course, that the parent of the eligible bank does not also control an
ineligible bank. See note 24 infra.
24. Any holding company, which in addition to controlling eligible banks also controls an
ineligible bank, would itself be ineligible for acquisition until the ineligible bank is divested
or becomes eligible by operating for ten years.
25. In this country's dual banking system, one of the options available to a bank is to
convert from a national to a state charter, or from a state to a national charter, in order to
avail itself of any advantage which it may discern in one or the other statutory or regulatory
framework. The National Bank Act and the Illinois Banking Act each permit the rechartering of a bank previously chartered under the other statute. 12 U.S.C. § 214a (1976); ILL.
ANN. STAT. ch. 17,
327 (Smith-Hurd, 1981).
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abandoned charter in determining whether it was chartered prior
to January 1, 1982, or whether it has engaged in banking for at
least ten years from the date it was chartered.
A "tacking" approach will undoubtedly also be taken where an
eligible bank converts to holding company form through a phantom bank reorganization in which the resulting bank operates
under a new charter. Section 3.05 expressly excludes from its prohibition on acquisition of recently-chartered banks the acquisition
of a newly chartered bank resulting from a phantom bank reorganization in which a bank converts to holding company form by
merging into an interim bank subsidiary of a newly-formed holding
company. The 1981 Act is silent, however, as to whether the resulting bank and its new holding company are eligible for immediate
acquisition or cannot be acquired until the bank has operated for a
period of ten years from the date of the bank's new charter. Again,
the bank regulators and courts will undoubtedly look to the date of
the eligible bank's original charter in determining whether the resulting bank was chartered before January 1, 1982, or whether it
has engaged in banking for at least ten years from the date it was
chartered.
Would an Acquiring Company Violate Section 3.05 by Creating
a Newly-Chartered Interim Bank and Merging It with an
Existing Bank in Order to be Assured of 100% Control of the
Existing Bank?
"Tacking" would also seem appropriate where an unaffiliated
holding company seeks to acquire an eligible target bank through a
phantom bank reorganization. A bank holding company seeking to
consummate a friendly acquisition of an eligible target bank may
not be able to enter into a stock purchase agreement with each of
the target bank's shareholders either because of their number or
because a minority are known to be unwilling to sell on the terms
offered. The holding company, however, may be reluctant to proceed with the acquisition unless it is assured of 100% control of
the target bank upon consummation of the acquisition.26 Because
neither a negotiated purchase nor a tender offer is likely to pro26. The holding company would normally prefer 100% control to ensure flexibility in
accommodating the subsidiary bank's dividend policy to the holding company's financial
needs and objectives (without risk of conferring a bonanza on minority shareholders if an
extraordinary dividend is declared) and to avoid possible disagreements with the minority
over the conduct of the subsidiary's business or the allocation of opportunities and expenses
among the constituent entities in the holding company system.
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duce the result desired by the holding company, an alternative
method of. consummating the acquisition must be found.
In order to assure 100% control, the holding company may desire to proceed with a phantom bank acquisition of the target
bank. Under this procedure, the holding company would cause an
interim bank to be chartered as its subsidiary. An agreement of
merger would be entered into pursuant to which the target bank
agrees to merge with the interim bank. The merger agreement
would provide that the shareholders of the target bank would receive, upon consummation of the merger, cash or securities of the
holding company, or both. If the proposed merger is approved by
the required percentage of the target bank's shareholders, the
merger would be consummated and the holding company would
own all of the shares of the surviving bank. If any of the shareholders of the target bank who voted against the merger exercise dissenters' rights, their sole remedy would be to receive cash in an
amount equal to the fair value of their shares immediately before
the merger. They could not elect to continue as minority shareholders of the surviving bank.
If the interim bank is chartered after January 1, 1982, and is the
survivor of the merger, the acquisition may arguably be prohibited
by the provisions of section 3.05 precluding the acquisition of
banks in operation for less than ten years. It is difficult to believe,
however, that the Illinois General Assembly could have intended to
preclude the acquisition of a bank chartered before January 1,
1982, or in operation four more than ten years, solely because the
acquisition is accomplished by means of a phantom bank merger.
Nevertheless, because section 3.05 is silent as to a third-party acquisition of a bank through a phantom merger, whereas it contains
an express exclusion for a phantom bank restructuring into a holding company owned by the same shareholders, "tacking" presents a
more difficult problem with regard to a phantom bank acquisition
than it does with regard to a charter conversion or change to holding company form.
Because the General Assembly was obviously concerned with the
date of chartering and the period of operations of the target rather
than the interim bank, no legislative purpose would be served by
reading the prohibition to preclude acquisition of the resulting
bank in a phantom merger acquisition if the resulting bank retains
the charter of the interim rather than the target bank. The purpose of the operating period limitation in section 3.05 is to prohibit
a bank holding company from expanding de novo, not to inhibit
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use of a merger technique for obtaining 100% control of a bank in
Illinois which has operated for ten years or was chartered and in
operation prior to January 1, 1982. There is no suggestion in the
legislative history or in the principal operative provisions of the
1981 Act of any legislative interest in limiting the method of bank
acquisitions to negotiated purchases and tender offers. Moreover,
section 28 of the Illinois Banking Act,2 7 which provides that a "resulting state or national bank shall be considered the same business and corporate entity as each merging bank or [in the case of a
charter conversion] the converting bank . . ." lends further support for a "tacking" approach under which the resulting bank
would be treated, for purposes of the 1981 Act, as a continuation of
the target bank. Thus, "tacking" would again seem to be in order
in the case of a phantom merger acquisition.
Although "tacking" seems clearly appropriate, a phantom
merger acquisition may also be exempted from the ten year operating requirement by section 3.06 of the 1981 Act.2 Under section
3.06, a company's acquisition of a newly-chartered interim bank in
the course of a phantom bank reorganization would be exempted
from section 3.05 if, following the acquisition, the interim bank
does not "carry on the banking business as a separate bank in Illi-

ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 17, 335 (Smith-Hurd, 1981).
Section 3.06 provides as follows:
Notwithstanding any other provisions of this Act, (a) if any company causes to
be chartered any bank in Illinois or acquires control (whether by purchase of
stock, merger, consolidation, acquisition of assets or otherwise) of any bank in
Illinois theretofore engaged in the banking business and at no time after such
company obtains control thereof does the bank, so caused to be chartered or so
acquired, carry on the banking business as a separate bank in Illinois maintaining main banking premises in this State, then, neither the acquisition nor the
retention by such company of control of such bank shall be unlawful under paragraph (a) of Section 3.02 of this Act and such bank shall not be considered a bank
of which such company has control, a bank caused to be chartered by such company, or a bank control of which is acquired by such company, within the meaning
of Sections 3.03, 3.04 or 3.05 of this Act; and (b) if any company causes to be
chartered, or acquires or at any time has control of, any bank in Illinois, and
thereafter such company ceases to have control of such bank, or such bank ceases
all of its Illinois banking operations or such bank ceases to carry on the banking
business in Illinois as a separate bank in Illinois maintaining main banking premises in this State, then, from and after the time of any such cessation, such company (notwithstanding that it shall theretofore have acquired or had control of
such bank, and whether or not it shall have caused the chartering thereof) shall
not be considered to have or retain control of such bank within the meaning of
Sections 3.03, 3.04 or 3.05 of this Act.
ILL. ANN. Stat. ch. 17, 2509 (Smith-Hurd, 1981) (emphasis added).
27.
28.
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nois maintaining main banking premises in this State .
",129
The above-quoted language may be interpreted to permit the acquisition of an interim bank irrespective of whether the interim
bank or the target bank is the survivor of the merger. Under this
interpretation, the interim bank, even if it is the surviving bank in
the merger, would not be deemed to be "carry[ing] on the banking
business as a separate bank in Illinois," because it never had an
independent existence as a separate operating institution. Rather,
the interim bank is only a structural medium for continuing the
previous business of the acquiree bank. Construed literally, however, the language may also mean that the acquisition of the interim bank would only be permissible if, upon the merger, the interim bank ceases to exist and the acquiree bank is the survivor
(i.e., if the interim bank is merged into the acquiree bank). This
narrow interpretation presumes that if the interim bank is the survivor of the merger, it would then become a bank "carry[ing] on
the banking business as a separate bank in Illinois maintaining
main banking premises in this State", and hence would not be
within the purview of the exemptive language. Although not entirely without merit, this narrow interpretation would appear to be
inconsistent with the purpose of section 3.05 and of the 1981 Act
generally.3 0

29. Id.
30. The history of the 1981 Act, as well as the apparent purpose underlying the prohibition on acquisition of recently-chartered banks, would appear to reinforce both the "tacking" principle and the broader interpretation of § 3.06. The 1981 Act is a successor to earlier
multibank holding company bills sponsored by the Association for Modern Banking in Illinois ("AMBI") and introduced in the Illinois legislature without success in 1973 and later
years. Those bills differed in one significant respect from the successful bill, also sponsored
by AMBI, which ultimately became the 1981 Act. The earlier bills imposed limits on the
number of banks which a bank holding company could acquire during various prescribed
periods. See, e.g., Senate Bill 935, introduced in the 78th General Assembly, April 14, 1973;
House Bill 2060, introduced in the 79th General Assembly, April 12, 1975; House bill 492,
introduced in the 80th General Assembly, February 24, 1977; Senate Bill 1050, introduced in
the 80th General Assembly, April 8, 1977; House Bill 1299, iitroduced in the 81st General
Assembly, March 29, 1979. Language similar in effect to the portion of § 3.06 quoted in the
text above appeared in various forms in such bills to ensure, among other things, that in a
phantom bank reorganization the acquiring company's acquisition quota would be charged
with only one rather than two banks. See, e.g., §§ 7 and 10 of Senate Bill 935 introduced in
the 78th General Assembly, April 14, 1973; §§ 7 and 9(c) of House Bill 492 introduced in the
80th General Assembly, February 24, 1977; §§ 3.05, 3.06, and 3.07 of House Bill 1299, introduced in the 81st General Assembly, March 29, 1979. A second purpose for including such
language was to ensure that an acquired bank whose main banking premises were, at the
time of the acquisition, closed or converted into a limited service facility of an acquiring
bank under § 5(15) of the Illinois Banking Act, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 17, T 311(15) (SmithHurd, 1981), would not be charged against the quota. Language similar to the exemption
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Although section 3.05 probably does not prohibit an acquisition
through a phantom bank merger in which the interim bank survives, nevertheless, there is sufficient uncertainty that, in the absence of corrective legislation, a careful lawyer might prefer to
structure the transaction in a manner not involving an interim
bank survivor to a phantom merger.
How can Transactions be Structured to Avoid the Risk that
Acquisition of an Interim Bank Surviving a Phantom Merger
Would Violate Section 3.05?
If a target bank is already the wholly-owned subsidiary of a
holding company which is both eligible and available for acquisition, the transaction can be readily structured so that the interim
bank problem will not arise under section 3.05. In these circumstances, the target bank's holding company could be merged with
the acquiring corporation or a corporate nonbank subsidiary of
that corporation. No interim bank would be needed. The merger
would be governed by applicable business corporation statutes, and
it would not matter whether it is a forward merger or a reverse
merger."' However, if the acquisition is for cash82 and a premium is
from § 3.05 for the reorganization of a bank into holding company form appeared in earlier
bills for the purpose, among other things, of ensuring that acquisition of an interim bank to
accomplish such a reorganization would not count at all against the quota provisions. See,
e.g., § 9(b) of House Bill 492, introduced in the 80th General Assembly, February 24, 1977.
Thus, in the context of many of the earlier bills, provisions comparable to the above language of § 3.06 made it clear that in determining whether a bank holding company had
exceeded the allotted quota of banks which it could acquire in any specified period, the
interim bank and the target bank would be counted only once even though, technically
speaking, each would be a bank acquired by such holding company.
In short, the narrow interpretation of the language "carry on the banking business as a
separate bank in Illinois" may have been appropriate in the context of many of the earlier
AMBI bills. However, in the context of the 1981 Act, which does not contain numerical
quotas, such interpretation would not be appropriate.
31. In a forward merger, the target's holding company would merge into the acquiring
corporation or its subsidiary. In a reverse merger, the acquiring corporation or its subsidiary
would merge into the target's holding company.
32. If the target bank's holding company is an Illinois corporation, a conventional cash
merger or cash consolidation may be impossible, because the applicable sections of the Ilinois Business Corporation Act contemplate conversion of the shares of each merging or consolidating corporation "into shares or other securities or obligations" of the surviving or new
corporation. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 32,
157.61(c), 157.62(c) (1979). It may be possible, nevertheless, to approximate the consequences of a cash merger or consolidation by causing the
surviving or new corporation to issue short-term notes to the shareholders of the target's
holding company in exchange for their shares. Alternatively, the state of incorporation of
the target's holding company could be changed prior to the transaction by merging the Illinois corporation into a corporation organized under the law of a state which permits cash
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offered for depreciable assets of the target bank, a merger with the
target bank's holding company would not provide the acquirer
with the benefits of a stepped-up tax basis for such assets.33
If the target bank's holding company does not own all of the
bank's shares, however, acquisition of the holding company would
not produce 100% control of the bank. If the holding company
owns less than all of the target's shares, or if the bank does not
have a holding company at the time of the proposed transaction, it
may be impractical or impossible to transform the bank into a
wholly-owned subsidiary of a holding company so that the acquisition can be accomplished through a merger of two business corporations rather than a phantom bank merger. 4
The section 3.05 interim-bank problem can also be avoided if it
is possible to structure the transaction as a reverse phantom bank
merger, although again, in the case of a cash merger in which a
premium is offered for depreciable assets, a reverse merger would
not provide the acquirer with the benefits of a stepped-up basis for
such assets.8 5 Under this procedure, the acquiring company's
newly-chartered interim bank subsidiary would be merged into the
target bank. The interim bank would "disappear" when the merger
is consummated. No matter how section 3.06 is construed, such a
reverse merger would fall within its exemptive language; even
under the narrow reading of section 3.06, the interim bank would
not survive as "a separate bank maintaining main banking premmergers and consolidations.
33. For federal tax purposes, a forward cash merger of the target bank's holding company into the acquiring corporation or its non-bank subsidiary would be treated as an acquisition of the target bank's stock. Rev. Rul. 69-6, 1969-1 Cum. Bull. 104. Although the acquirer's basis for such stock would be equal to the purchase price paid by it, the basis for
the bank's assets would be unaffected by the transaction. A reverse cash merger of a nonbank subsidiary of the acquiring corporation into the target bank's holding company would
be regarded as an acquisition of the stock of the target bank's holding company. Rev. Rul.
79-273, 1979-2 Cum. Bull. 125. The basis of the target bank's assets would again be
unaffected.
34. The exclusion in § 3.05 from the limitation on acquisition of new banks would permit
the existing bank to reorganize into holding company form prior to the acquisition. This
would not only be time consuming and expensive, however, but tax, regulatory, and other
considerations may intervene to prevent or complicate the transaction.
35. In a phantom bank forward cash merger for a price exceeding book value, the resulting bank will receive a stepped-up basis for its assets because the transaction will be treated
for federal tax purposes as a sale and purchase of the target bank's assets. Rev. Rul. 69-6,
1969-1 Cum. Bull. 104. In a phantom bank reverse cash merger, the resulting bank would
carry over the basis of the acquired bank because the transaction would be treated for federal tax purposes as a purchase of the target bank's stock. Rev. Rul. 79-273, 1979-2 Cum.
Bull. 125.
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ises in this State."
Would a reverse merger of this kind be permitted under the National Bank Act, where the surviving bank is a national bank, or
under the Illinois Banking Act, where it is a state bank? 6 Although the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency ("OCC") has
indicated that, under section 215a of Title 12 (the merger section
of the National Bank Act), it would deny its approval for a phantom merger in which the target bank rather than the interim bank
is the survivor, it would appear that the transaction could be successfully accomplished under section 215 of Title 12, (the consolidation section of the National Bank Act). 7
This curious difference in treatment by the OCC is a consequence of the National Bank Act's inconsistent treatment of dissenters' rights. Section 215a accords dissenters' rights only to
shareholders of the constituent bank which does not survive the
merger.18 Ifthe OCC were to sanction the use of reverse mergers
under section 215a, the only shareholders entitled to statutory dis-

36. Under modern state corporation statutes, reverse mergers are routinely permitted,
i.e., transactions in which a corporation acquires control of a target company by forming a
new "shell" subsidiary and merging it into the target, whose shareholders receive as consideration cash or, in a reverse triangular merger, shares or other securities of the acquiring
parent.
37. The OCC, in a publication entitled "Overview and Procedures for an Application to
Organize an Interim National Bank," states:
The Comptroller's Office does not accept applications for reverse triangular
mergers (i.e., where the interim national bank would be merged into the existing
national bank). Therefore, this overview applies only to those applications where
the interim national bank is the receiving association in a merger or where an
existing national bank proposes to consolidate with an interm [sic] national bank.
In such a merger proposal, the resulting national bank will be given the charter of
the interim national bank. In consolidation proposals, the resulting bank may take
the charter of either the existing national bank or the interim national bank. In all
cases the resulting national bank will be given the charter number of the existing
national bank.
OCC Document identified as CC 7020 3/81.
In written guidelines regarding the chartering of interim banks in connection with phantom bank reorganizations, the OCC states:
If the proposal involves the merger of an operating national bank or an operating
state-chartered bank with an interim national bank that is about to be organized
solely for the purpose of facilitating the establishment of a bank holding company,
the interim national bank must be the receiving or resulting bank. Therefore, if
approved, the resulting bank will have the charter of the interim bank, but may
elect to retain the charter number and title of the operating national bank. If the
operating bank is state-chartered, a new national bank charter number will be
assigned, and the resulting bank's title must contain the word "national."
OCC Document identified as CC 7020-44 3/81 (emphasis in original).
38. 12 U.S.C. § 215a(b) (1976).
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senters' rights would- be the shareholders of the interim bank.
Since this result would be contrary to the intent of the statute, the
OCC, according to its staff, would not authorize a reverse merger
under section 215a, even if the merger agreement between the
banks reserved to the target bank's dissenting shareholders contractual dissenters' rights identical to those provided for in section
215a.10 The staff apparently takes the position that the OCC
should not have to make a determination regarding the validity or
enforceability of contractual terms designed to preserve dissenters'
rights.
Section 215 (the consolidation section), however, which expressly
permits a "consolidation" of two banks in which one of the two is
the surviving bank, accords dissenters' rights to the shareholders of
both banks. If the rationale articulated by the OCC staff is in fact
the only reason for the OCC's unwillingness to permit a reverse
merger under section 215a, there is no sound basis in logic or policy for an OCC objection to a reverse merger (called a "consolidation") under section 215. The OCC appears to recognize this in its
written materials regarding interim banks, which state that "[iln
consolidation proposals, the resulting bank may take the charter of
'40
either the existing national bank or the interim national bank.
Moreover, the OCC staff has acknowledged that reverse mergers
have been approved under section 215, although there have been
few such mergers. 1
The Illinois Commissioner's staff has indicated that the Commissioner would probably also permit acquisitions to be effected
through reverse phantom bank mergers. 4 The dissenters' rights
provisions of the Illinois Banking Act do not present the difficulties posed by section 215a.'
In a Contested Takeover, Could a Successful Tender Offer Be
Followed by a Phantom Bank Reorganization to Eliminate the
39. Conversation with John T. Berry, Regional Director for Corporate Activities, Chicago Regional Administrator's Office, OCC (November, 1981).
40. "Overview and Procedures for an Application to Organize an Interim National
Bank," note 37 supra.
41. Conversation with John T. Berry, Regional Director for Corporate Activities, Chicago Regional Administrator's Office, OCC (November, 1981).
42. Conversation with Corinne J. Gieseke, Legal Counsel, Illinois Commissioner of
Banks and Trust Companies (October, 1981).
43. See §§ 23 and 29 of the Illinois Banking Act. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 17, 11 330, 336
(Smith-Hurd, 1981).
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Remaining Minority Interest?
A company desiring to acquire a bank whose management is hostile to the acquisition may decide to proceed initially with a tender
offer to the target bank's shareholders. If the tender offer is successful, the acquiring company may wish to eliminate any remaining minority interest in the bank through use of a phantom bank
merger. Section 3.05 exempts from the prohibition on acquisitions
of recently-chartered banks a phantom bank reorganization by
which a bank converts to holding company form. A phantom bank
merger to eliminate minority shareholders, on the other hand, is in
the nature of an acquisition rather than a conversion to holding
company form, and would not qualify for the exemption. In order
for a phantom bank reorganization to come within the language of
the exemption, minority shareholders must have the opportunity
to become shareholders of the bank holding company created by
the reorganization." Since the exemption does not apply, a phantom bank merger to eliminate the minority would present the same
interim bank issue under section 3.05 as an acquisition of a target
bank by means of a phantom merger.
Additionally, a reorganization accomplished in order to eliminate
a minority may present special regulatory problems. The OCC has
to date been unwilling to permit a phantom bank reorganization to
be used for the purpose of eliminating a minority.4" Is this reluctance misplaced when an unaffiliated acquiring company discloses
in tender offer documentation an intent to proceed with a phantom bank reorganization as a second step following the acquisition
of control through the tender offer? The 0CC currently has under
review its position regarding phantom bank reorganizations, and a
written statement of policy may be forthcoming.40

44. The § 3.05 exemption requires that in a phantom bank reorganization to restructure
an existing bank into holding company form, the shareholders of the new holding company,
and their respective percentage shareholdings, immediately following the reorganization be
substantially identical to the shareholders, and their respective percentage shareholdings, of
such bank immediately before the reorganization, except to the extent that the bank's
shareholders exercise statutory dissenters' rights. The language does not expressly require
that the minority shareholders be offered the same class of stock which the controlling
shareholder would receive. It is therefore conceivable that a reorganization could be effected
under the 3.05 exemption in which the controlling shareholder receives common stock and
the minority shareholders receive preferred stock, but it is by no means clear that this could
be accomplished.
45. Conversation with Robert M. Kurucza, Director, Securities and Corporate Practices
Division, OCC, Washington, D.C. (September 16, 1981).
46. Id. Mr. Kurucza informed the writer that the new policy statement may take the
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. The Illinois Commissioner's staff advises that over the years it
has had only two applications for phantom bank reorganizations
proposed for the sole purpose of eliminating minority .shareholders. 7 Both applications were turned down by the Commissioner.4"
The Commissioner's office is currently reassessing its position re-.
garding such transactions.4"
GEOGRAPHICAL LIMITATIONS

The 1981 Act divides the State of Illinois into five regions, 50
which are shown on the map of Illinois set forth in the Appendix

to this article.51 The Act prohibits a bank holding company from
acquiring, on or after January 1, 1982, direct or indirect control of

position that phantom bank reorganizations in which a minority interest is eliminated would
be permissible only if, in addition to the desire to eliminate the minority, there is a "valid
business purpose" for the reorganization. He expressed doubt that, if the OCC were to impose a business purpose rule, advance notice in the tender offer materials of intent to effect
a second step phantom bank reorganization would alone satisfy the requirement.
Courts have engrafted business purpose requirements onto various state corporation laws,
but have een singularly unsuccessful in giving them meaningful or consistent content. A
number of jurisdictions have held that a valid business purpose must exist for a going private merger, and that a majority shareholder may not effect such a merger for the sole
purpose of freezing out minority shareholders. See, e.g., Bryan v. Brock & Blevins Co., 490
F.2d 563, 570 (5th Cir. 1974) (citing Georgia law); Singer v. Magnavox Co., 380 A.2d 969, 980
(Del. 1977); Tanzer Economic Assoc., Inc. Profit Sharing Plan v. Universal Food Specialties,
87 Misc. 2d 167, 383 N.Y.S.2d 472, 479, 482-83 (Sup. Ct. 1976). There is considerable disagreement among the courts and commentators, however, as to what constitutes a valid business purpose. The Delaware Chancery Court, for example, indicated in Young v. Valhi, 382
A.2d 1372, 1377 (Del. Ch. 1978), that tax savings and the elimination of potential conflicts of
interest are not proper business purposes. In New York, the rule appears to be contrary. See
Schulwolf v. Cerro Corp., 86 Misc. 2d 292, 380 N.Y.S.2d 957 (Sup. Ct. 1976) (upholding a
merger purportedly made for the purpose of consolidating the two corporations' tax returns
and avoiding conflicts of interest in intercompany transactions). Both Delaware and New
York courts have suggested that a going private merger can be justified on the ground that
it will reduce the costs and liabilities incident to public status under the federal securities
laws. See Temple v. Combined Properties Corp., 410 A.2d 1375, 1378-79 (Del. Ch. 1979);
Tanzer Economic Assoc., Inc. Profit Sharing Plan v. Universal Food Specialties, 87 Misc. 2d
167, 383 N.Y.S.2d 472, 483 (Sup. Ct. 1976). Former SEC Commissioner A. A. Sommer, Jr.,
however, has taken the position that the avoidance of such costs and liabilities would not
constitute a valid business purpose. "'Going Private': A Lesson in Corporate Responsibility" (Nov. 14, 1974) (unpublished address in Notre Dame Law School Library), reprinted in
[1974] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 80,010; accord, Berkowitz v. Power/Mate Corp., 137 N.J.
Super. 36, 342 A.2d 566, 571 n.4 (Ch. Div. 1975) (dictum).
47. Conversation with Corrine J. Gieseke, Legal Counsel, Illinois Commissioner of Banks
and Trust Companies (October, 1981).
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Section 3.01 of the 1981 Act, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 17, 2504 (Smith-Hurd, 1981).
51. See Appendix A infra at 81.
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banks in Illinois located in more than two regions. 2 More specifically, section 3.04 permits a bank holding company to acquire direct or indirect control only of banks in Illinois located in its home
region and in not more than one contiguous region."3 Since regions
I and V are each contiguous to only one other region, only holding
companies located in regions II, III and IV have a choice as to the
second region in which they make acquisitions. 4 "Bank holding

company," as used in the 1981 Act, includes one-bank as well as
multibank holding companies. 55
Illinois and Out-of-State Bank Holding Companies
The geographical limitations imposed by the 1981 Act on bank
holding companies vary according to whether the operations of a
holding company's banking subsidiaries are principally conducted
in Illinois ("Illinois bank holding companies") or outside of Illinois
("out-of-state bank holding companies").6 In determining the
state where the operations of a holding company's banking subsidiaries are principally conducted, section 3.07 provides that deposits
shall be used as the measure. Why deposits are used for this purpose, whereas assets are used as the measure for all other purposes
relating to the geographical limitations, is unclear.

52.
53.

ch. 17, 2507 (Smith-Hurd, 1981).
Section 3.04 provides as follows:
On or after the effective date of this amendatory Act enacted by the 82nd General Assembly, no bank holding company or subsidiary thereof may acquire control of, directly or indirectly, an existing bank or banks except a bank or banks
whose main banking premises are located within the banking region designated by
the bank holding company in accordance with the provisions of Section 3.03 or
Section 3.07 of this Act or in a banking region contiguous to said region. If more
than one banking region is contiguous to the banking region designated by the
bank holding company under Section 3.03 or Section 3.07 of this Act, the bank
holding company may choose one of such contiguous banking regions in which to
acquire control of a bank or banks. No bank holding company may acquire control
of a bank or banks in more than two banking regions. For purposes of this Section, a bank in Illinois shall be deemed to be in the banking region in which its
main banking premises are located.
ILL. ANN. STAT.

ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 17, 2507 (Smith-Hurd, 1981).
54. See Appendix A infra at 81.
55. Section 2(d) of the 1981 Act, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 17, 2502(d) (Smith-Hurd-1981).
56. The geographical limitations applicable to Illinois bank holding companies are found
in §§ 3.01, 3.03 and 3.04. Section 3.07 establishes modified rules for out-of-state bank holding companies. Nevertheless, §§ 3.01, 3.03 and 3.04 presumably apply also to out-of-state
bank holding companies to the extent not inconsistent with § 3.07.
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Home Regions

Under section 3.03, an Illinois bank holding company is deemed
to be located in the region in which the main banking premises of
the largest bank in Illinois (measured by total banking assets) controlled by such company are located. Curiously, in the event of a
combination of two or more bank holding companies, section 3.03
provides that the resulting company is deemed located not in the
region where its largest controlled bank is located, but rather in
the home region of the largest of the combining bank holding companies as measured by total banking assets. The reason for this
apparent inconsistency is unclear. Moreover, if a holding company
resulting from a merger is deemed located in a region other than
that where its largest controlled bank is located, and that bank is
later divested or closed, section 3.03 produces an additional anomaly. That section provides that if a bank in Illinois, which shall
have been the largest such bank controlled by a bank holding company, shall cease to be so controlled or discontinue the banking
business, the company's home region shall thereafter be the region
in which the largest bank in Illinois which continues to operate
under the company's control is located.
Although the applicable language of section 3.07 (indeed, most
of section 3.07) defies interpretation, it would appear that an outof-state bank holding company which controls banks in Illinois located in more than one region may select as its home region the
57
region in which any one of such banks is located.
A bank holding company is required to notify the Commissioner
of its home region within 30 days after the effective date of the Act
or within 30 days after it becomes a bank holding company, whichever is later." Thereafter, it is required to give notice to the Commissioner of any change in its home region within 30 days after the
event resulting in such change.5 9
Prohibitionof Out-of-State Bank Holding Companies and
Grandfatheringof Those in Existence
Section 3.07 permits an out-of-state bank holding company to
57. Section 3.07 provides in part that, "[flor purposes of this Act, any [out-of-state] . ..
bank holding company shall be deemed to be located in the banking region in which such
bank holding company owns or controls a majority of the voting shares of a bank or banks
in Illinois. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 17, 1 2510 (Smith-Hurd, 1981).
58. Section 3.04 of the 1981 Act, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 17, 2506 (Smith-Hurd, 1981).
59. Id.

Loyola University Law Journal

[Vol 13

control a bank or banks in Illinois only if, on December 31, 1981, it.
is a registered bank holding company under the Federal Act and
lawfully controls at least two banks in Illinois. Thus, out-of-state
bank holding companies are prohibited by the Act, except for
those which lawfully controlled two or more banks in Illinois prior
to the effective date of the 1957 Act and were therefore also
grandfathered under that Act. To the author's knowledge, there is
but one such company, General Bancshares, a Missouri-based corporation which controls several banks in southern Illinois.
Section 3.07 prohibits an out-of-state bank holding company not
grandfathered under the 1981 Act from owning more than 5% of
the voting shares of any bank in Illinois. Unlike most of the other
prohibitions in the 1981 Act, this provision could be interpreted to
be retroactive. Under the 1957 Act, a company, whether or not it
controlled banks located in other states, could lawfully own up to
14.9% of the voting shares of an unlimited number of banks in
Illinois, in addition to controlling 15 % or more of the voting shares
of one other bank in Illinois. If interpreted and enforced retroactively, the 5% limitation could require an out-of-state bank holding company which lawfully owned shares prior to the effective
date of the 1981 Act, to divest a portion of those shares.
Grandfatheringof Illinois Multibank Holding Companies
Although specific with regard to out-of-state multibank holding
companies, 60 the 1981 Act is not specific regarding the grandfathering of Illinois multibank holding companies in existence on the effective date. Under section 3.03, each Illinois bank holding company "in existence and controlling one or more banks in Illinois"
on December 31, 1981, is deemed located in the region where the
largest bank in Illinois controlled by such company is located. This
suggests that there may be in existence on that date Illinois multibank as well as one-bank holding companies.
It is unlikely that there will be in existence on that date any
corporations which are Illinois multibank holding companies, 1 but
60. Section 3.07 of the 1981 Act, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 17, 2510 (Smith-Hurd, 1981).
61. It is conceivable that there presently exist corporations which were also in existence
on the effective date of the 1957 Act and then owned two or more banks in Illinois. If so,
they were grandfathered under the 1957 Act. Such corporations, however, would long ago
have been required to register under the Federal Act, and the writer is unaware of any
which have done so. In any event, any corporation which was an Illinois multibank holding
company grandfathered under the 1957 Act, if it exists on December 31, 1981, also will be
grandfathered under the 1981 Act, the prohibitions of which apply only to acquisitions on or
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it is entirely possible that there may then exist noncorporate Illinois multibank holding companies. Although individuals, whether
acting alone or (subject to certain exceptions) in concert, would
probably not constitute a "company" under the 1957 Act, it is possible that "chain-banking" arrangements currently exist in Illinois,
whereby a "company" has been inadvertently created through use
of a formalized partnership, joint venture, voting or similar arrangement, or by reason of joint action by centrally controlled cor62
porate affiliates and their principals.
To the extent that there are such inadvertent Illinois multibank
holding companies in existence on December 31, 1981, it is conceivable that they will be grandfathered under the 1981 Act even
though they were unlawful under the 1957 Act when created. Unlike section 3.07, which grandfathers an out-of-state bank holding
company only if it lawfully controls banks in Illinois on December
31, 1981, the provisions of the Act inferentially grandfathering preexisting Illinois multibank holding companies are not limited to
companies which were lawful prior to the effective date."
The 1981 Act does not require a grandfathered Illinois or out-ofstate holding company to divest banks in Illinois controlled by it
prior to the effective date, even though such banks are located in

after January 1, 1982.
62. The Federal Reserve Board and its staff have taken the position that, to be considered a "company" under the Federal Act, a joint arrangement must be something more than
individuals acting in concert. In general, there must be a partnership, joint venture, business
or other long-term trust, voting agreement or similar arrangement formalized by written
agreement. In some cases, however, the Board has found a "company" in the absence of
such a written agreement, usually where there is joint action by the members of a corporate
group with unified control, such as the group in Arlington Bancorp, Inc. See text accompanying notes 16-19 supra. Neither the courts, nor the Illinois Attorney General or the Commissioner, has interpreted the word "company" in the context of the 1957 Act. In view of
the similarity of the 1957 and 1981 Acts to the Federal Act in this regard, it is probably fair
to assume that if the issue were to arise under the 1957 or 1981 Act, the courts or Illinois
officials would take a position not unlike that of the Federal Reserve Board. It is perhaps
noteworthy that, to date, there has been relatively little enforcement activity by the Board
regarding failure of partnerships, joint ventures, or trusts to register as bank holding companies under the Federal Act. Similarly, the author is not aware of any judicial or administrative action in Illinois with respect to noncorporate bank holding companies under the 1957
Act.
It is also conceivable that an entity organized in corporate form might be an inadvertent
"bank holding company." The definition of "bank holding company" in the 1957 Act not
only refers to direct "or indirect" control of the requisite number of voting shares of two or
more banks, but also includes any company which "controls in any manner" the election of
a majority of the directors of each of two or more banks. The words "indirect" and "control
in any manner" could present close factual issues in some cases.
63. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 17, 1 2506 (Smith-Hurd, 1981).
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regions other than the two in which such holding company is permitted to expand after January 1, 1982. Neither does the 1981 Act
condition acquisitions of additional banks on divestiture of banks
located in regions other than the home region or a contiguous region. Thus, if on January 1, 1982, an Illinois bank holding company controls three banks, one in Chicago (Region I), one in Peoria
(Region III), and one in Springfield (Region IV), it would be required to designate as its home region the region in which the largest of such banks is located. The company could thereafter acquire,
without any obligation to divest any of the original three banks,
additional banks located in its home region and in not more than
one contiguous region. If, in the above example, the Chicago bank
is the largest, Region I would be the home region, and the holding
company could, after January 1, 1982, acquire additional banks located in Region I or II. Thus, after the effective date, it could control banks in Regions I, II, III and IV, although it could not expand by acquisition of additional banks in Regions III and IV.
If the multibank holding company referred to in the foregoing
example is a noncorporate "company" in the nature of a partnership, joint venture, or trust, it will be faced with an interesting
legal question. Should it file a home region notice of the kind
which bank holding companies existing on the effective date are
required to file with the Commissioner not later than January 31,
1982?""If it does, it will probably be conceding that it was an unlawful bank holding company under the 1957 Act.
Purchase of Additional Shares of Controlled Banks
Section 3.07 also provides that an out-of-state bank holding
company which, on December 31, 1981, lawfully holds a majority of
the voting shares of any bank or banks in Illinois, may continue to
own such shares and may acquire additional shares of such banks.
This provision would permit acquisitions of additional shares of
banks located in regions other than those in which such a company
could expand by acquisition of additional banks in Illinois.
Although there is no similar provision regarding acquisition by
an Illinois bank holding company of additional shares of a bank
controlled on the effective date but not located in a region within
which such company is permitted to expand, the rule for Illinois
companies is probably at least as favorable. An Illinois bank hold-

64.

Id.
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ing company's acquisition of further shares of a bank which it already controls would not cause the company to "acquire control"
of such bank, and consequently such acquisition would not violate
section 3.04 of the 1981 Act.6"
ACQUISITION OF OUT-OF-STATE COMMERCIAL BANKS

Section 3.04 provides that, on or after the effective date of the
1981 Act, "no bank holding company. . . may acquire control of
. . . an existing bank or banks"6 except for banks located in its
home region and not more than one contiguous region. This prohibition is not, by its terms, limited to any "bank or banks in Illinois" as are most of the other provisions of the 1981 Act. Does this
mean that a bank holding company subject to the 1981 Act cannot
acquire banks located outside of Illinois? In view of the current
debate over the wisdom of federal statutes prohibiting acquisition
of banks located outside a holding company's home state, particularly financially troubled banks, this may not be a moot question.6 7
The failure to limit the geographical limitation of section 3.04 to
acquisition of banks in Illinois should not foreclose a bank holding
company subject to the 1981 Act from acquiring banks located in
other states. The operative prohibitions of the 1981 Act are in section 3.02, and the prohibitions on acquisition in section 3.02 refer
only to banks in Illinois, not to banks located out of state. Although section 3.02 declares unlawful a wide array of acquisition
transactions, it permits substantially all acquisitions which are not
prohibited by sections 3.04 or 3.05. Thus, although sections 3.04
and 3.05 are themselves phrased as prohibitions, they are strange
prohibitions, indeed, as they appear only to narrow, and not to
broaden, the prohibitions set forth in section 3.02. Moreover, the
prohibition in section 3.04, if read literally, would apply to bank
holding companies subject to the Illinois Act whether or not they

65. Since such acquisition of further shares would be permissible under § 3.04, it would
not violate § 3.02(a)(3). Indeed, since § 2(d) of the 1981 Act defines "control" to include
situations in which a company owns less than a majority of voting shares (ILL. ANN. STAT.
ch. 17, 2502(d) (Smith-Hurd, 1981), an Illinois bank holding company might be able to
argue that it can lawfully acquire additional shares of "controlled" banks in which it did not
have a majority interest at the effective date, even though such banks are not located in its
home or applicable contiguous region. There is a significant risk, however, that a court
would reject such an argument.
0
66. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 17, 2507 (Smith-Hurd, 1981).
67. Opponents of the so-called "Douglas-Amendment" to the Federal Act, 12 U.S.C. §
1842(d)(1) (1976) are becoming more vocal, and the possibility has become real that the age
of interstate banking is close at hand, at least within circumscribed limits.
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are Illinois bank holding companies. It is most unlikely that the
Illinois General Assembly intended to prohibit out-of-state bank
holding companies from acquiring banks located outside of Illinois.
ANTITRUST CONSIDERATIONS: IMPACT OF THE

1981

ACT

The 1981 Act does not prohibit or restrict banking acquisitions
which are or may be anticompetitive. Rather, the competitive effects of an acquisition permitted by the 1981 Act will be tested
under section 7 of the Clayton Act 68 and section 3(c)(2) of the Federal Bank Holding CompanyAct.69 Nevertheless, the 1981 Act's geographical limitations and prohibition of expansion through de
novo entry or acquisition of recently-chartered banks should prove
to be important contextual factors, together with the Illinois prohibition on branch banking, in the competitive assessment of bank
acquisitions in Illinois.
The Federal Bank Holding Company Act, like the Bank Merger
Act,7 0 requires the reviewing banking agency 7 to make a two-step
analysis of a contemplated bank merger. 2 First, the agency must
determine whether the effect of the acquisition "in any section of
the country may be substantially to lessen competition, or tend to
create a monopoly. . .,T Second, if such an effect is found to be
reasonably likely to result, 4 the agency must determine whether
68. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1976) (amended 1980).
69. 12 U.S.C. § 1842(c)(2) (1976).
70. 12 U.S.C. § 1828(c)(5)(B) (1976).
71. Acquisitions of banks by "companies" are subject to the approval of the Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System, pursuant to § 3 of the Federal Bank Holding
Company Act. 12 U.S.C. § 1842 (1976).
72. 12 U.S.C. § 1842(c)(2) (1976).
73. Id. The Bank Merger Act adopts the same standard. 12 U.S.C. §
1828(c)(15)(B)(1976). This standard is identical to that included in § 7 of the Clayton Act,
15 U.S.C. § 18 (1976). Additionally, the Federal Bank Holding Company Act, 12 U.S.C. §
1842(c)(1) (1976), forbids approval of the contemplated acquisition if it would result in monopoly or is part of an attempt to monopolize, as does the Bank Merger Act, 12 U.S.C. §
1828(c)(5)(A). Thus, the two acts adopt the same standard of illegality that is incorporated
in § 2 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1976). See United States v. Connecticut Nat'l
Bank, 418 U.S. 656, 668-71 (1974). Therefore, presumably the same principles govern administrative review by banking agencies under the Bank Holding Company Act and Bank
Merger Act that apply to the judicial consideration of a case brought by the Department of
Justice under § 7 of the Clayton Act, or under § 2 of the Sherman Act. See Decision, 91
BANKING L. J. 64 (1974). The Illinois antitrust statute, which would also apply to acquisitions of banks in Illinois pursuant to the 1981 Act, was modeled upon and, as interpreted by
the courts, is similar in effect to the Sherman Act. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38,
60-1 et seq.
(1979). The Illinois statute is therefore not discussed separately in this article.
74. Only those acquisitions posing a reasonable probability of substantially lessening
competition have been found to violate § 7 of the Clayton Act. Brown Shoe Co. v. United
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the "anticompetitive effects of the proposed transaction are clearly
outweighed in the public interest by the probable effect of the

transaction in meeting the convenience and needs of the commu7' 5
nity to be served.
Although there have been numerous administrative and judicial

interpretations of these laws as applied to bank acquisitions, the
discussion in this article of past decisions will be limited to a brief
exploration of the principal bank acquisition decisions of the
United States Supreme Court. Additionally, the likely effects of
the 1981 Act on the application of the antitrust laws to the acquisition of banks in Illinois will be discussed.
Determining the Relevant Geographic Market
In order to determine whether an acquisition is likely to affect
competition adversely, it is first necessary to determine the rele-

vant markets in which competition will be affected by the acquisition. Definition of the relevant market is, of course, frequently outcome-determinative in the assessment of a proposed acquisition

under the standards of section 7 of the Clayton Act. The more
broadly the market is defined, the smaller the market shares the

constituent banking entities will hold; the smaller the market
shares, the less likely it is that a court or regulator will prohibit the
acquisition on the ground that its "effect. . .may be substantially
to lessen competition." Conversely, if the relevant market is nar-

rowly defined, the constituent entities may not be considered to be
in direct competition, and a challenge premised upon the theory of
potential competition 6 would not be likely to succeed."
States, 370 U.S. 294, 323 (1962).
75. 12 U.S.C. § 1842(c)(2) (1976). The "convenience and needs" defense is available only
if the acquisition is deemed anticompetitive under the standard analogous to that of § 7 of
the Clayton Act, but not anticompetitive under the standard analogous to § 2 of the Sherman Act. In United States v. Third Nat'l Bank, 390 U.S. 171, 192 (1968), the Supreme
Court held that in assessing the "convenience and needs" of the community, means alternative to the merger should be considered. Additionally, in United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l
Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 372 (1963), the Supreme Court determined that the "convenience and
needs" assessed should be those in the same geographic market as that used in assessing the
anticompetitive effect of the acquisition.
76. The potential competition theory relates to geographical market extension acquisitions involving parties operating in the same product market but not in the same geographic
market, or to product market extension acquisitions, involving parties operating in the same
geographic market but not in the same product market. Essentially, the theory is premised
on the desirable effects a perceived potential entrant to a market will have on the competitive practices of firms operating within the market, and on the belief that actual entry of the
acquirer into the market through de novo entry or a foothold acquisition (acquisition of an
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Direct Competition

In the landmark 1963 case of United States v. PhiladelphiaNational Bank,7 in which section 7 of the Clayton Act was held to be
applicable to bank mergers,79 the United States Supreme Court for
the first time articulated guidelines governing the geographic market in which the likely effects of a proposed bank acquisition
would be assessed. The proper inquiry, according to the Court, "is
not where the parties to the merger do business or even where they
compete, but where, within the area of competitive overlap, the effect of the merger on competition will be direct and immediate."80
The Supreme Court concluded that since locational convenience
is a critical factor in banking, the relevant market is the local market within which it is practicable for average bank customers to
turn for banking services. 8 ' Such customers, according to the
existing competitor so small that it is equivalent to expanding de novo) will reduce concentration and enhance competitive market performance. See United States v. Falstaff Brewing
Corp., 410 U.S. 526 (1973); FTC v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568 (1967).
77. Arguments by the Federal Reserve Board and the Antitrust Division of the Justice
Department have been rebuffed by the courts in virtually every case in which they sought to
prevent either a bank acquisition or a merger on a potential competition theory. See, e.g.,
United States v. Marine Bancorporation, Inc., 418 U.S. 602 (1974); Republic of Texas Corp.
v. Board of Governors, 649 F.2d 1026 (5th Cir. 1981); Mercantile Texas Corp. v. Board of
Governors, 638 F.2d 1255 (5th Cir. 1981); Southwest Mississippi Bank v. FDIC, 499 F. Supp.
1 (S.D. Miss. 1979); United States v. United Virginia Bankshares, Inc., 347 F. Supp. 891
(E.D. Va. 1971); United States v. First Nat'l Bancorporation, Inc., 329 F. Supp. 1003 (Colo.
1971), afJ'd per curiam, 410 U.S. 577 (1973). The 1981 Act's prohibition of de novo expansion, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 17, $ 2507 (Smith-Hurd, 1981), the anti-branching provisions of the
Illinois Banking Act, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 17, 1 313 (Smith-Hurd, 1981), and the limitations
on the number of off-premises limited service facilities which a bank in Illinois may maintain and the services which may be offered in such a facility, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 17,
311(15) and (19) (Smith-Hurd, 1981), render the potential competition theory especially
weak in Illinois. See notes 119-142 infra and accompanying text. See also Department of
Justice Merger Guidelines § 18 (1968).
78. 374 U.S. 321 (1963).
79. The Celler-Kefauver Act of December 29, 1950, Pub. L. No. 899, ch. 1184, 64 Stat.
1125, amended § 7 of the Clayton Act by extending its prohibition to asset acquisitions by
corporations subject to the jurisdiction of the Federal Trade Commission. Since banks were
not subject to the Federal Trade Commission's jurisdiction, 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(2) (1976)
(amended 1979), it was generally thought that § 7 did not apply to bank asset acquisitions.
See Hearings on S. 1698 Before the Subcomm. on Financial Institutions of the Senate
Comm. on Banking and Currency, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 325-26 (1965). The Supreme Court,
per Justice Brennan, dispelled this belief in PhiladelphiaNational Bank, stating that: "It
would be anomalous to conclude that Congress, while intending the Sherman Act to remain
fully applicable to bank mergers and § 7 of the Clayton Act to remain fully applicable to
pure stock acquisitions by banks, nevertheless intended § 7 to be completely inapplicable to
bank mergers." 374 U.S. at 355.
80. 374 U.S. at 357.
81. Id. at 357-59.
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Court, are those neither so large that they can readily shop outside
local markets for banking services, nor so small that they would be
unlikely to select any bank other than the closest one.8 2 The
Court's apparent concern was to avoid standards which might, in
effect, exempt the banking industry from constraints on anticompetitive acquisitions. If the relevant market were international, national or even regional in scope, the market shares of even the very
largest banks would be so small that virtually no bank acquisition
would be anticompetitive. If, on the other hand, each bank's relevant geographical market were only its immediate neighborhood, it
would be relatively infrequent that any two banks would be in the
same market.
In PhiladelphiaNational Bank, the merging banks had assets of
more than $1 billion and $750 million respectively.83 The Court determined the relevant geographical market to be the four-county
Philadelphia metropolitan area." The banks were the second and
third largest in that market, the former being the 21st largest in
the United States. 5 The bank resulting from the proposed merger
would have controlled at least thirty percent of the commercial
banking business in the market.8 6 The merger would have caused
the combined market share of the two largest banks in the market
to rise from forty-four percent to fifty-nine percent, a significant
increase in concentration. 87 The Court held that the merger would
violate section 7 of the Clayton Act, because its effect might be
substantially to lessen competition in the relevant market.88
Again, in United States v. Connecticut National Bank,89 the Supreme Court considered a proposed merger between two relatively
large banks, the fourth and eighth largest in Connecticut. The two
banks operated in adjoining regions in the southwest portion of

82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.

Id. at 361.
Id. at 331.
Id. at 361.
Id. at 331.
Id. at 364.
Id. at 365.
Id. at 371. The Supreme Court concluded:
Specifically, we think that the merger which prqduces a firm controlling an undue percentage share of the relevant market, and results in a significant increase
in the concentration of firms in that market, is so inherently likely to lessen competition substantially that it must be enjoined in the absence of evidence clearly
showing that the merger is not likely to have such anticompetitive effect.
Id. at 363.
89. 418 U.S. 656 (1974).
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the state, one in New Haven and nearby towns and the other in
Bridgeport and nearby towns. 90 As part of the merger plan, the
banks agreed to divest themselves "of a sufficient number of offices
in the four-town area [located between Bridgeport and New Haven] to render insignificant the degree of overlap of the areas of
actual operation."91 "Accordingly," the Court stated, "the case has
been presented to us strictly as a geographic market extension
merger on the part of both banks." '
The district court had concluded, in a decision in favor of the.
banks, that the relevant geographic market was the State of Connecticut. 9 Reversing and remanding for further findings, the Supreme Court rejected the district court's market assessment, holding that "the relevant geographic market of the acquired bank is
the localized areas in which that bank is in significant, direct competition with other banks, albeit not the acquiring bank."" The
Court conceded that the district court's task on remand would be
difficult, because of the fragmented distribution of banking offices
90. Id. at 658.
91. Id. at 659.
92. Id. Thus, the Supreme Court was presented with an action premised in part upon
the theory of potential competition. See note 76 supra.
93. United States v. Connecticut Nat'l Bank, 362 F. Supp. 240, 281-83 (D. Conn. 1973).
In addition, the district court concluded that although New York was not an extension of
the Connecticut market, "the influences of the New York banks require serious consideration and analysis" with regard to "the impact of the merger upon competition and its effect
in serving the convenience and needs of the community." Id. at 283. By defining the relevant market as the entire state, the district court appears to have laid the foundation for
analyzing the case as one involving direct competition in the large, statewide market, rather
than potential competition. The district court's opinion includes, however, an analysis of
both potential competition, id.at 286-88, and direct competition, id. at 283-86. Apparently
concluding that the district court had- never focused on the correct issues, the Supreme
Court rejected the district court's definition of the relevant geographic market, stating:
The State cannot be the relevant geographic market, however, because CNB
and FNH are not direct competitors on that basis (or for that matter on any other
basis pertinent to this appeal). The two banks do not operate statewide, nor do
their customers as a general rule utilize commercial banks on that basis. The offices of the two banks are restricted to adjoining sections of the southwest segment of Connecticut. Although the two banks presumably market a small percentage of their loans to large customers on a statewide or broader basis, it is
undoubtedly true that almost all of their business originates locally. For example,
"about 88% of CNB's total deposit business derive[s] from the towns in which
CNB has offices." 362 F. Supp., at 250. As the district court noted in a finding
that is inconsistent with its conclusion on the appropriate section of the country,
"[clommon sense. . . would indicate that the relevant market areas of CNB and
FNH generally coincide with where each has established branch offices."
418 U.S. at 667.
94. 418 U.S. at 667.
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of the two banks resulting from the Connecticut branching statute
which had "created a checkerboard of 'open' and 'closed' towns.""
Noting that the Government could not rely, without more, on
Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas, or on town boundaries, to
define the relevant geographic markets of the two banks, the Court
indicated that the Government on remand would be required to
produce evidence supporting geographical local market definitions
based on economic realities."
In Lexington Bank,97 a case involving relatively small banks operating in small metropolitan communities, the Supreme Court defined the relevant geographic market more narrowly than it had in
Philadelphia National Bank. The banks involved in the challenged merger were the first and fourth largest in Lexington, Kentucky,98 with assets of $65 million and $21 million respectively."
The bank resulting from the merger would also have been relatively small, although it would have been larger than all of the remaining banks in Fayette County combined.100 Less than three
percent of the aggregate dollar deposits of each bank were held by
depositors located outside of Lexington.101 Except for large, national concerns, most business customers in the area were "restricted to the Fayette County banks for their working capital
loans" and non-Lexington banks did a "negligible amount of business in the county."10
' The Supreme Court found the relevant geographic market to be Fayette County. Concluding that substantial
competition in this market would have been eliminated by the
merger, the Court held that it was a combination in restraint of
trade and in violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act.1 "0
4
In United States v. PhillipsburgNational Bank & Trust Co.,10
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.

Id. at 669.
418 U.S. at 669-70.
United States v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. of Lexington, 376 U.S. 665 (1964).
Id. at 668.
Id. at 676 (Harlan, J., dissenting).

100. Id. at 669.
101. Id. at 668. Less than 5% of each bank's depositors were located outside of
Lexington.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 672-73. The merger was not challenged under the Clayton Act, apparently
because the Government had brought the Lexington Bank case under the Sherman Act
prior to the Supreme Court's decision in PhiladelphiaNational Bank, which for the first
time applied the Clayton Act to bank mergers. There is no reason to believe that the Court's
definition of geographical market would have differed had the case arisen under the Clayton
Act.
104. 399 U.S. 350 (1969).
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the Supreme Court analyzed the factors relevant to the definition
of geographic market when assessing a combination of relatively
small banks in a small community. The two combining banks were
located in Phillipsburg, New Jersey. The population of Phillipsburg and its bordering suburbs was 28,500, and the population of
Easton, Pennsylvania and its bordering suburbs, immediately
across the river from Phillipsburg, was 60,000. The metropolitan
1
areas of the two cities in effect constituted "one town."''0
All seven banks in "one town" were small, with assets ranging
from $13.2 million to $75.6 million. The two combining banks had
assets of $23.9 and $17.3 million respectively. They were the two
largest of the three banks in Phillipsburg, but only the fourth and
sixth largest in "one town." The resulting bank would have had
assets of $41.1 million and would have been the second largest of
the six remaining banks in "one town."'" The main offices of the
two banks were directly opposite one another on the same downtown street. The only branch of one was located across a suburban
highway from one of the two branches of the other.10 7 Approximately seventy-five percent of the deposits of each of the banks
were $1,000 or less, and substantially all of the deposits of each
were $10,000 or less. The vast majority of the loans of both banks
were in the range of $2,500 or less, and approximately ninety percent of the loans were $10,000 or less.'0 8 More than ninety percent
of the depositors of each bank were residents of "one town," and of
0 9
these less than ten percent lived in Easton.2
"One town" is part of the Lehigh Valley, which was then a region of 1,000 square miles with a population of 492,000 and served
by 38 commercial banks. Although there was considerable mobility
among the residents of the Lehigh Valley for social, shopping, and
employment purposes, "[c]ustomer preference and conservative
banking practice. . . tended to limit the bulk of each. . . bank's
business to its immediate geographic area."11 0
The OCC approved the merger, defining the relevant geographic
market not as "one town," but rather as most of the Lehigh Valley.
Approval was granted despite independent reports from the Federal Reserve Board, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.

Id. at 354.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 356.
Id.
Id. at 357.
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and the Attorney General finding "one town" to be the relevant
market and reporting that the merger would have a significantly
harmful effect upon competition in this market."' The district
court found in favor of the defendant banks in the ensuing litigation, selecting as the relevant geographic market an area approximately four times the size of "one town" with a population of
216,000 and served by eighteen banks."8
The Supreme Court reversed, disagreeing with both the district
court and the OCC on the selection of the relevant geographic market. The Court selected "one town" as the relevent market, stating:
Commercial realities in the banking industry make clear that
banks generally have a very localized business. We observed in
PhiladelphiaBank ... that "[iln banking, as in most service in-

dustries, convenience of location is essential to effective competition. Individuals and corporations typically confer the bulk of
their patronage on banks in their local community; they find it
impractical to conduct their banking business at a distance....
The factor of inconvenience localizes banking competition as effectively as high transportation costs in other industries." In locating "the market area in which the seller operates," it is important to consider the places from which it draws its11 business, the
location of its offices, and where it seeks business. 3
Focusing on the predominance of small customers constituting the
banks' clientele, the Court concluded that the banks competed
within a radius of only a few miles.11 4 Having assessed the competi111. Id. at 358. The Bank Merger Act requires the responsible bank regulatory agency,
prior to approving an application for approval of a merger transaction, to solicit reports
from the Attorney General and the two other federal banking agencies on thb competitive
impact of the proposed combinaton. 12 U.S.C. § 1828(c)(4) (1976).
112. United States v. Phillipsburg Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 306 F. Supp. 645 (D. N.J.
1969).
113. 399 U.S. at 362-63. The Justice Department had sought to define the relevant market as metropolitan Phillipsburg only. Nevertheless, it subsequently expressed willingness to
"accept 'one town'" as the relevant geographic market. There are indications in the Supreme Court's opinion that, had the Justice Department persevered in the narrower geographical definition, the Court might well have selected only Phillipsburg as the relevant
market. Id. at 362-65.
114. The Supreme Court specifically noted:.
The localization of business typical of the banking industry is particularly pronounced when small customers are involved.. . . Small depositors have little rea-

son to deal with a bank other than the one most geographically convenient to
them. For such persons, geographic convenience can be a more powerful influence
than the availability of a higher rate of interest at a more distant, though still
nearby, bank. The small borrower, if he is to have his needs met, must often depend upon his community reputation and upon his relationship with the local
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tive effect of the proposed merger in this drastically smaller market, the Court concluded that it was "inherently likely to lessen
competition substantially."1 1 5
The federal bank regulatory agencies, in contrast to the Supreme
Court, have adopted a more ad hoc approach to defining the geographic market likely to be affected by a proposed bank combination. With regard to the Federal Reserve Board, this seems incongrous because, according to its former general counsel, the Board
has over the years developed a list of.standardized geographical
markets and "advises prospective applicants to consult their local
Federal Reserve Bank in advance of filing to get the latest market
delineation."'" In a 1981 decision regarding the proposed acquisition of a newly chartered small suburban bank near Chicago by a
company affiliated with other banks in Chicago suburbs, the Board
found the relevant market to be the "Chicago banking market,"
which it defined as "approximated by Cook, DuPage, and Lake
Counties, Illinois."1 17
At a recent seminar, a member of the staff of the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago confirihed the Federal Reserve practice of
advising the parties to a proposed bank combination of the Federal
Reserve's definition of the market. He acknowledged, however,
that with respect to Illinois there is less experience and precedent
to draw upon to define geographical markets than in states where

banker.
Id. at 363-64.
115. Id. at 367. Summarizing the competitive impact of the proposed merger, the Supreme Court noted:
The combined bank would become the second largest in the area, with assets of
over $41,100,000 (19.3% of the area's assets), total deposits of $38,400,000
(23.4%), and total loans of $24,900,000 (27.3%). The assets held by the two largest banks would then increase from 49% to 55%, the deposits from 56% to 65%,
the loans from 49% to 63%, and the banking offices from seven to 10. The assets
held by the three largest banks would increase from 60% to 68%, the deposits
from 70% to 80%, the loans from 64% to 76%, and the banking offices from 10 to
12. In Phillipsburg alone, of course, the impact would be much greater: banking
alternatives would be reduced from three to two; the resultant bank would be
three times larger than the only other remaining bank, and all but two of the
banking offices in the city would be controlled by one firm.
Id.
116. In contrast, according to one commentator, the OCC and FDIC tend to determine
relevant geographic markets case-by-case on the basis of the service areas of the banks involved. Hawke, "Competitive Factors: Review of the 1980 Decisions"; Legal Times of Washington, Vol. III, No. 37, February 23, 1981.
117. Arlington Bancorp, Inc., et al., _ Fed. Res. Bull. No. - (August 19. 1981). See notes
16-19 supra and accompanying text.
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mergers and acquisitions have been more common. He indicated
that applicants who disagree with the Federal Reserve's definition
of the market in their case are welcome to register their objections
and request reconsideration.11 s
Potential Competition
In United States v. Marine Bancorporation, Inc.," 9 the Supreme Court addressed at length the potential competition theory' 20 as a ground for establishing a section 7 violation in bank
acquisition cases. Significantly, the banks involved were located in
the State of Washington, where the prevailing state law relevant to
the proposed merger was similar in several respects to that prevailing in Illinois after January 1, 1982.
The Government brought an action under section 7 of the Clayton Act, challenging a proposed merger between the second largest
bank in the state, with $1.8 billion in assets, and the ninth largest,
with $112 million in assets. 12" The former was based in Seattle, the
latter in Spokane, and neither bank had offices in the home city of
the other. The proposed merger would permit the Seattle-based
bank to operate for the first time as a direct participant in the
Spokane market.12 The Spokane-based bank had seven branch of-

fices in the Spokane metropolitan area, being the third largest in
the Spokane market and holding 18.6 percent of the total deposits
there. 23 The three largest banks in the Spokane market controlled
ninety-two percent of the total deposits.""'
Under Washington state law, a state bank was prohibited from
branching in any municipality (in which any other bank transacted
business) outside the municipality in which its own home office
was located, except by acquiring an existing bank."25 By virtue of
the McFadden Act,"s2 this branching limitation also applied to national banks based in Washington. Washington state law also prohibited a bank, in the absence of consent from the State Supervi118. Remarks of David R. Allardice, Senior Economist, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, at a seminar presented as part of the Continuing Legal Education Program of the
Chicago Bar Association. (October 29, 1981).
119. 418 U.S. 602 (1974).
120. See note 76 supra.
121. 418 U.S. at 606-07.
122. Id. at 605.
123. Id. at 607.
124. Id. at 609.
125. Id. at 610.
126. 12 U.S.C. § 36 (1976).
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sor of Banking, from acquiring or merging with a new bank for a
period of at least ten years.12 7 In addition, Washington state law
prohibited a bank which acquired an existing bank operating in a.
municipality other than that of the acquiring bank from maintaining branch locations in that municipality in addition to the ones
maintained by the acquired bank at the time of the acquisition.'"
Finally, multibank holding companies were prohibited by Washington law.'2 9
The Court noted that under a potential competition analysis,
"a market extension merger may be unlawful if the target market
is substantially concentrated, if the acquiring firm has the characteristics, capabilities and economic incentive to render it a perceived potential de novo [or foothold] entrant and if the acquiring
firm's premerger presence on the fringe of the target market in
fact tempered oligopolistic behavior on the part of existing participants in that market."'' 30
In other words, the competitive conditions in a concentrated market can be changed in a manner violative of section 7 if a real possibility that a significant potential competitor "waiting in the
wings" might come into the market is a deterrent to anticompetitive behavior by the dominant participants in the market, and that
possibility is eliminated through merger of the potential competitor with one of such participants.
The Government contended, as a second potential competition
theory, that a merger which "eliminates the prospect for a longterm deconcentration of an oligopolistic market that in theory
might result if the acquiring firm were forbidden to enter except
through a de novo undertaking or through [a foothold] acquisition" violates section 7.131 The Court acknowledged that it had left
this question open in prior potential competition cases.182
As a predicate to its analysis, the Court held that "geographic
market extension mergers by commercial banks must pass muster
under the potential-competition doctrine" but that "the application of the doctrine to commercial banking must take into account

127.
128.

418 U.S. at 610.
Id. at 610-11.

129. Id. at 611.
130. Id. at 624-25.
131. Id. at 625.
132. Id. at n.28. The question was left open in United States v. Falstaff Brewing Corp.,
410 U.S. 526 (1973).
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the unique federal and state regulatory restraints on entry into
that line of commerce." 3 Moreover, a prerequisite to a successful
potential competition challenge, according to the Court, is a finding of "dominant participants in the target market engaging in interdependent or parallel behavior and with the capacity effectively
to determine price and total output of goods or services."'" Finally, the Court stated that the Government, in order to be successful in asserting the potential competition theory, must show
that there are means available for the acquiring entity to enter the
target market through de novo expansion or through a foothold
acquisition. 3 5
The Court found the Spokane market to be oligopolistic. " Nevertheless, it concluded that, because of the state limitations on
branch banking and multibank holding companies, the acquirer
could not have been perceived as a true potential competitor
"waiting in the wings" under the traditional potential competition
18 7
theory.
With respect to the Government's second theory, the Court held
that even if the Government were correct that the acquirer could
move into the Spokane market through foothold acquisition, it had
failed to prove that the acquirer could have contributed significantly to the deconcentration of that market over time.188 The
Court noted that two small banks existed in the Spokane market
which might be available to the acquirer for foothold entry, but
concluded that state law restraints on expansion were likely to preclude the acquirer from becoming a significant competitor in the
market following a foothold acquisition. " 9 Because the Govern-

133. 418 U.S. at 627.
134. Id. at 630.
135. Id. at 633.
136. Id. at 632.
137. Id. at 639-40.
138. Id. at 638.
139. The Court particularly stressed Washington's prohibition on branch banking,
stating:
[Ilt does not follow that an acquisition of either would produce the long-term
market-structure benefits predicted by the Government. Once NBC acquired either of these banks, it could not branch from the acquired bank. This limitation
strongly suggests that NBC would not develop into a significant participant in the
Spokane market, a prospect that finds support in the record. In 1964, one of the
largest bank holding companies in the country, through its Seattle-based subsidiary, acquired a foothold bank with two offices in Spokane. Eight years later this
bank, Pacific National Bank, held a mere 2.2% of total bank deposits in the Spokane metropolitan area, an insignificant increase over its share of the market at

Loyola University Law Journal

[Vol. 13

ment had failed to show that any means of entry into the market
other than the proposed merger would have significant procompetitive effects, the second theory was rejected. 140
The Court concluded its opinion with the following guidelines
for future courts considering potential competition issues in geographic market extension cases involving banks:
In applying the doctrine of potential competition to commercial
banking, courts must, as we have noted, take into account the extensive federal and state regulation of banks. Our affirmance of
the District Court's judgment in this case rests primarily on state
statutory barriers to de novo entry and to expansion following entry into a new geographic market. In States where such stringent
barriers exist and in the absence of a likelihood of entrenchment,
the potential-competition doctrine-grounded as it is on relative
freedom of entry on the part of the acquiring firm-will seldom
bar a geographic market extension merger by a commercial bank.
In States that permit free branching or multibank holding companies, courts hearing cases involving such mergers should take
into account all relevant factors, including the barriers to entry
created by state and federal control over the issuance of new bank
charters. Testimony by responsible regulatory officials that they
will not grant new charters in the target market is entitled to
great weight, although it is not determinative. To avoid the danger of subjecting the enforcement of the antitrust laws to the policies of a particular bank regulatory official or agency, courts
should look also to the size and growth prospects of the target
market, the size and number of banking organizations participating in it, and past practices of regulatory agencies in granting

the date of the acquisition .. . An officer of this bank, called as a witness by the
Government, attributed the poor showing to an inability under state law to establish further branches in Spokane.

Id.
140. Specifically, the Court observed:
[The Government] failed to demonstrate that the alternative means offer a reasonable prospect of long-term structural improvement or other benefits in the target-market. In fact, insofar as competitive benefits are concerned, the Government
is in the anomalous position of opposing a geographic market extension merger
that will introduce a third full-service banking organization to the Spokane market, where only two are now operating, in reliance on alternative means of entry
that appear unlikely to have any significant procompetitive effect. Accordingly, we
cannot hold for the Government on .-. . [the second theory]. Indeed, since the
preconditions for that theory are not present, we do not reach it ....
We reiterate that this case concerns an industry in which new entry is extensively regulated

by the State and Federal Governments.
Id. at 638-39.
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charters. If regulatory restraints are not determinative, courts
should consider the factors that are pertinent to any potentialcompetition case, including the economic feasibility and likelihood of de novo entry, the capabilities and expansion history as
well as the structural characteristics of the target market." '
Market extension acquisitions permitted under the 1981 Act are
subject to challenge under the potential competition theory. Nevertheless, in light of the Supreme Court's decision in Marine Banin
corporation,the significant limitations on geographic expansion
142
Illinois would be likely to render such a challenge ineffective.
Determining the Relevant Product Market
In 1963, the Supreme Court in PhiladelphiaNational Bank " '
held that "the cluster of products (various kinds of credit) and services (such as checking accounts and trust administration) denoted
by the term 'commercial banking' . . . composes a distinct line of
commerce." 4 4 The Court observed that "[ciommercial banks are
unique among financial institutions in that they alone are permitted by law to accept demand deposits" and "[t]his distinctive
power gives commercial banking a key role in the national
4
economy.' 5
In 1969, the Supreme Court in Phillipsburg'"reaffirmed Philadelphia National Bank in this regard. It observed:
PhiladelphiaBank emphasized that it is the cluster of products and services that full-service banks offer that as a matter of
trade reality makes commercial banking a distinct line of commerce. Commercial banks are the only financial institutions in
which a wide variety of financial products and services-some
unique to commercial banking and others not-are gathered together in one place. The clustering of financial products and services in banks facilitates convenient access to them for all banking customers. For some customers, full-service banking makes
possible access to certain products or services that would otherwise be unavailable to them; the customer without significant collateral, for-example, who has patronized a particular bank for a
variety of financial products and services is more likely to be able

141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.

Id.
See note 76 supra.
United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963).
374 U.S. at 356.
Id. at 326.
United States v. Phillipsburg Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 399 U.S. 350 (1970).
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to obtain a loan from that bank than from a specialty financial
institution to which he turns simply to borrow money. In short,
the cluster of products and services termed commercial banking
well beyond the various products and
has economic significance
1 47
services involved.
In the intervening years, these distinctions have persistently
eroded with the advent of checking privileges for money market
funds, NOW accounts, and share drafts offered by thrift institutions, and with the expansion of statutory lending powers of nonbank depositary institutions. The Federal Reserve's various computations of the money supply and the mounting confusion over
whether a decrease in the supply of money determined by one
measure can be accounted for by an increase in another measure
are silent testimony to the fact that bank demand deposit services
face fierce direct competition.
In the face of these rapid changes that are restructuring the roles
of financial institutions, the courts and regulators have persevered
in their treatment of commercial banks as competitors in a product
market separate from thrifts and other depository, lending, and
fiduciary institutions when assessing the effects of bank acquisitions on competition. The Supreme Court has predicted, however,
that this may not continue to be appropriate. Although the Court
reaffirmed its position that commercial banking is a separate line
of commerce in Connecticut National, 14 8 it acknowledged that a
large measure of similarity existed between the services marketed
by commercial and savings banks in Connecticut. 149 Nevertheless,
the Court concluded that the overlap was "not sufficient at this
stage of the development of savings banks in Connecticut to treat
them together with commercial banks."1 50 Although it recognized
that savings banks would soon be able to provide checking account
services which would increase direct competition between savings
and commercial banks, the Court considered it significant that,
even with this new check authority, savings banks would be permitted to have only personal checking accounts, not business
accounts. 1 5 1

147. 399 U.S. at 360-61 (emphasis in original).
148. United States v. Connecticut Nat'l Bank, 418 U.S. 656 (1974). See notes 89-96
supra and accompanying text.
149. 418 U.S. at 663.
150. Id. at 664.
151. Id. at 665.
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Unlike earlier Supreme Court decisions, the court's opinion in
Connecticut National foresees a day when commercial banking

will no longer be considered the relevant product market, at least
in some sections of the country.1 52 In light of the accelerated erosion of the lines between commercial banks and other depository
and nondepository financial entities in recent years, the position of
bank regulatory agencies appears to be moving in this direction. In
several recent decisions assessing the competitive effects of bank
acquisitions, bank regulators have defined the relevant product
market to be commercial banking, but then have "shaded" the
market by considering competition from thrift and other nonbanking entities in order to support a determination that the proposed
combination would not be likely to substantially lessen competition.153 Even the Federal Reserve Board has begun to "flirt more
brazenly with the idea that competition from thrift institutions
should be taken into account in assessing the competitive impact
of a commercial bank acquisition."'
Finally, over the years the
lower federal courts have paid increasingly greater attention to the
competitive market shares of nonbank competitors when analyzing
various product submarkets.1 5 In short, the day is probably not far
off when the Supreme Court will reassess its position that commercial banking is a separate line of commerce, but that day has not
yet arrived.
152.

The Supreme Court concluded:
We do not say, and Phillipsburg National Bank . . .and Philadelphia National Bank ... do not say, that in a case involving a merger of commercial banks
a court may never consider savings banks and commercial banks as operating in
the same line of commerce, no matter how similar their services and economic
behavior. At some stage in the development of savings banks it will be unrealistic
to distinguish them from commercial banks for purposes of the Clayton Act. In
Connecticut, that point may well be reached when and if savings banks become
significant participants in the marketing of bank services to commercial enterprises. But, in adherence to the tests set forth in our earlier bank merger cases,
which we are constrained to follow, we hold that such a point has not yet been
reached.

Id. at 666.
153. See, e.g., Federal Reserve Board Approval of United Bank Corporation of New
York Acquisition of the Sullivan County National Bank of Liberty, Liberty, New York,
April, 1981 Federal Reserve Bulletin, at 358.
154. Hawke, "Competitive Factors: Review of 1980 Decisons," Legal Times of Washington, Vol. III, No. 37, February 23, 1981.
155. See, e.g., United States v. Connecticut Nat'l Bank, 362 F. Supp. 240, 285 (D. Conn.
1973).
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The Regulatory Framework*
The Federal Reserve Board has been the least liberal of the federal bank regulators in permitting expansion through bank acquisitions. Consequently, counsel in other jurisdictions have sought,
whenever possible, to structure such transactions as bank mergers
or asset acquisitions by banks, rather than holding company acquisitions, so that the OCC or FDIC, rather than the Board, would
have final authority to grant or deny the application.1 ' Branch
banking continues to be unlawful in Illinois, however, and the 1981
Act provides the only authority for geographical expansion of fullservice banking in Illinois. Thus, counsel dealing with acquisitions
of banks in Illinois pursuant to the 1981 Act will not have the luxury of such forum shopping, and applications to the Federal Reserve Board pursuant to the Federal Act will be a standard
requirement.

156. Hawke, "Competitive Factors: Review of 1980 Decisions," Legal Times of Washington, Vol. III, No. 37, February 23, 1981.
In states where branch banking is permitted, a holding company system can take over a
target bank either through a stock acquisition by the holding company which maintains the
acquired bank as a separate bank subsidiary, through merger of the target bank with an
existing or newly created bank subsidiary of the holding company, or by acquisition of the
target bank's assets by a bank subsidiary. Direct acquisition by the holding company is
subject to approval of the Federal Reserve Board under the Federal Bank Holding Company
Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1842 (1976). Approval of a merger with, or an acquisition of assets by, a
bank subsidiary is governed by the Bank Merger Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1828 (1976). The federal
regulator with final decision powers is the principal regulator of the resulting bank, which
will be the Comptroller of Currency in the case of a national bank, the Board of Governors
of the Federal Reserve System in the case of a state chartered bank which is a member of
the Federal Reserve System, and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation in the case of a
state nonmember bank insured by the corporation. 12 U.S.C. § 1828(c)(2) (1976). Therefore,
only those mergers which result in a state bank which is a member of the Federal Reserve
System are subject to the principal regulation of the Board.
The provisions of the Bank Merger Act regarding competitive aspects are substantially
identical to those of the Federal Bank Holding Company Act, but the OCC, with respect to
mergers in which a national bank results, and the FDIC, with respect to mergers in which a
state nonmember bank results, have interpreted such provisions with greater leniency than
the Board. Hawke, "Competitive Factors: Review of 1980 Decisions," Legal Times of Washington, Vol. III, No. 37, February 23, 1981. Indeed, in several situations where the Board
denied an application on competitive grounds, the parties have restructured the transaction
so that it would be subject to the primary jurisdiction of a different federal regulator and
then applied and received approval from such regulator. For example, early in 1980, the
Federal Reserve Board denied an application by Toledo Trustcorp to acquire Defiance
Bank, on the ground that even if market shares were shaded to reflect thrifts, the acquisition would still present substantially adverse competitive effects. In December 1980, the
OCC approved the same transaction restructured as a merger between banks, noting that
"the presence of aggressive savings and loan associations exerts a procompetitive influence
on the commercial banks" in the relevant market. Id.
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Under the Board's delegation rules, 157 less sensitive applications
to acquire banks in Illinois will be processed by the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago. The circumstances requiring an application
to be processed by the Board of Governors in Washington include
the following: (i) the acquirer and acquiree each ranks among the
State's ten largest banking institutions in terms of total domestic
banking assets, or each holds more than $100 million of total deposits in banking offices in the same local market and together
they control over 5% of total deposits in banking offices in that
local market; (ii) the application raises a significant policy issue or
legal question on which the Board of Governors has not established its position; or (iii) a written substantive objection to the
application has been properly made. 158
The Board has historically sought to play a major discretionary
role in shaping the structure of evolving banking markets. To this
end, the Board has interpreted the Federal Bank Holding Company and Bank Merger Acts to authorize it to deny, on competitive
grounds, applications to acquire banks even where the proposed
acquisition would not violate the antitrust laws.159 However, four
federal courts of appeals have reached the opposite conclusion. 160
Although the special provisions regarding competition set forth in
the Federal Bank Holding Company and Bank Merger Acts permit
the federal bank regulators, upon a finding that community needs
and benefits outweigh anticompetitive considerations, to approve a
bank acquisition which, in the absence of such special provisions,
would violate the antitrust laws, the courts of appeals are in agreement that such special provisions do not confer authority on the
bank regulators to deny on competitive grounds acquisitions permissible under the antitrust laws. The unanimity among the circuits to date on this point would suggest that any denial by the
Board on competitive grounds will be reversed on appeal, unless
the reviewing court is satisfied that the proposed acquisition would
tend substantially to lessen competition in any market within the
157. Federal Reserve Board Rules Regarding Delegation of Authority. 12 C.F.R. § 265.
158. Federal Reserve Board Rules Regarding Delegation of Authority. 12 CFR §
265.2(f)(22).
159. Hawke, "Competitive Factors: Review of 1980 Decisions," Legal Times of Washington, Vol. III. No 37, February 23, 1981.
160. Couiity Nat'l Bancorporation v. Board of Governors, - F.2d - (8th Cir. 1981)(en
banc); Mercantile Texas Corp. v. Board of Governors, 638 F.2d 1255 (5th Cir. 1981); MidNebraska Bancshares v. Board of Governors, 627 F.2d 266 (D.C. Cir. 1980); Washington
Mutual Savings Bank v. FDIC, 482 F.2d 459 (9th Cir. 1973).
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meaning of section 7 of the Clayton Act.
Antitrust Role of the Justice Department
The Federal Bank Holding Company Act requires the Board,
upon receipt of a company's application to acquire a bank, to notify the bank's principal regulator (in the case of a national bank,
the OCC, and in the case of a state bank, the State supervisory
authority) and to allow 30 days for such regulator to submit its
views and recommendations.1 61 Additionally, immediately upon
Board approval of an application, the Board is required to notify
the Justice Department, so that the latter may challenge the acquisition on antitrust grounds if it elects to do so.16 The acquisition
may not be consummated until 30 days after the date of Board
approval. If the Justice Department elects to contest the acquisition under the antitrust laws, it must commence an action within
such 30-day period. Commencement of such an action stays the
effectiveness of the Board's approval, unless otherwise ordered by
the court. In such action, the court reviews de novo the issues
presented. If the Justice Department fails to commence action
under the antitrust laws within the 30-day period, it cannot thereafter bring an action to challenge the acquisition on antitrust
grounds.1 63
Justice Department Merger Guidelines
Parties to a contemplated acquisition have a strong interest in
knowing whether the acquisition is likely to be challenged by the
Justice Department. The Justice Department Merger Guidelines, "6" adopted in 1968, have been viewed, at least until very recently, as reflecting the Antitrust Division's position regarding
161. 12 U.S.C. § 1842(b) (1976). If the principal regulator disapproves the application,
the Board so notifies the applicant. A hearing then must be held not less than 10 nor more
than 30 days from the time such notice is given. The Board then grants or denies the application on the basis of the record made in such hearing.
162. 12 U.S.C. § 1849(b) (1976). Unlike the Bank Merger Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1828(c)(4)
(1976), the Federal Bank Holding Company Act does not require the Board to notify the
Justice Department, and to request from it a report on competitive factors, before acting on
an application for acquisition of a bank. The Board, in nondelegation cases (i.e., cases reserved for decision to the Board of Governors rather than delegated to a Federal Reserve
bank), however, follows the procedure of notifying the Justice Department and requesting
such a report prior to acting on an application, in addition to notifying Justice at the time of
approval. See Federal Reserve Board Internal Procedures regarding bank acquisitions under
the Federal Bank Holding Company Act.
163. 12 U.S.C. § 1842 (1976).
164. U.S. Dep't. of Justice Merger Guidelines (May 30, 1968).
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mergers and acquisitions.
The Guidelines define a "market" to include "any grouping of
sales (or other commercial transactions) in which each of the firms
whose sales are included enjoys some advantage in competing with
those firms whose sales are not included." 1 65 Since customer proximity provides a competitive advantage to a particular bank,1" the
Guidelines are consistent with the Supreme Court's position that
the relevant market for testing the competitive effect of a bank
acquisition is local.1 67
The Guidelines define the relevant product market as a service
which "is distinguishable as a matter of commercial practice from
other. . . services."1 8 Thus, if an appreciable segment of the public for some reason prefers services provided by banks to similar
services provided by thrift institutions, bank services would comprise the relevant product market. Banks, by this analysis, would
enjoy an advantage over thrift institutions in providing those services, justifying the exclusion of thrifts from the market. On the
other hand, if the public ceases to distinguish between banks and
other types of financial institutions in its selection of the source of
financial services, the Guidelines would require the inclusion of
those other types of institutions in the relevant product market.
The legality of a merger between competitors in a relevant market is tested under the Guidelines on the basis of market share
data. The Guidelines distinguish those markets which are highly
concentrated, defined as those markets in which the market share
of the four largest firms totals seventy-five percent or more,1 6 9 from
markets which are not highly concentrated, with mergers in the
former type of market, of course, being more vulnerable to Justice
Department challenge.17 0 The Guidelines assess the impact of po165. Id. at V 3.
166. See notes 76-115 supra and accompanying text.
167. See, e.g., United States v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. of Lexington, 376 U.S. 665
(1964). Geographic markets are further defined as any "commercially significant" section
where the product is sold, so long as it does not "clearly appear that there is no economic
barrier that hinders sales from outside." Dep't. of Justice Merger Guidelines, 1 3(ii) (1968).
168. Id. at 3(i).
169. Id. at 5.
170. Id. at 6. The Guidelines indicate that the Department of Justice will "ordinarily
challenge" a merger if the market shares of the constituent firms exceed the following:

ACQUIRING FIRM
5%
10%
15%
20%

ACQUIRED FIRM
5%
4%
3%
2%

or
or
or
or

more
more
more
more
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tential competition in terms of market shares, indicating disapproval where "one of the most likely entrants to the market" acquires any firm with twenty-five percent or more of the market, or,
if the market is highly concentrated, where it acquires any of the
leading firms in the market.1 7 '
William Baxter, Assistant Attorney General and head of the Antitrust Division, has been highly critical of the Merger Guidelines."17 He has expressed particular displeasure with the Guidelines' emphasis on market share data, favoring a case-by-case
analysis of the probable effects of mergers on the basis of all relevant information. 7 3 Mr. Baxter has stated that the Antitrust Division is currently in the process of preparing a new Merger Guide
for publication by Spring of 1982.174 If the new Merger Guide reflects the opinions of the Assistant Attorney General, reliance will
no longer be placed principally upon market share data by the Justice Department in determining whether to challenge a proposed
acquisition. This same pragmatic approach may also be taken in
assessing the impact of potential competition and in identifying
relevant markets. Mr. Baxter's approach suggests that such factors

25% or more
1% or more
If the market is "highly concentrated," the tolerable shares are reduced as follows:
ACQUIRING FIRM
ACQUIRED FIRM
4%
4% or more
16%
2% or more
15%
1% or more
Id. at 5.
171. Id. at 1 18. The Guidelines state that the Department of Justice will "ordinarily
challenge" a combination between one of the most likely entrants to the market and (i) any
firm with approximately 25% or more of the market; (ii) one of the two largest firms in a
market in which the shares of the two largest firms amount to approximately 50% or more;
(iii) one of the four largest firms in a market in which the shares of the eight largest firms
amount to approximately 75% or more, provided the acquiree firm's share of the market
amounts to approximately 10% or more; or (iv) one of the eight largest firms in a market in
which the shares of these firms amount to approximately 75% or more, provided either (A)
the acquiree firm's share of the market is not insubstantial and there are not more than one
or two likely entrants into the market, or (B) the acquiree firm is a rapidly growing firm. Id.
172. In a press conference in August of 1981, Baxter stated:
The merger guidelines, in existence since 1968, have not in fact been followed by
any Administration over the last eight years at least. The private bar did not take
them seriously. Everyone knew that they did not reflect enforcement intentions of
the Division. There is a body of case law on mergers and to the extent there is
guidance available to anyone it is in that "case law."

1027 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) A-4 (August 13, 1981).
173. 1025 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) AA-2 (July 30, 1981).
174. 1027 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) A-4 (August 13, 1981) (statement by
Assistant Attorney General Baxter).
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as the statutory limitations in Illinois upon de novo expansion,
branch banking, the number of off-premises limited-service facilities wlqich a bank can maintain, and the scope of services which
can be offered at such a facility are likely to be accorded significant
weight by the Antitrust Division, both in defining the relevant
markets and in testing the competitive effects of mergers.
Antitrust Aspects of Proposed Acquisitions Under the 1981 Act
Several inferences may be drawn from the decisions of the
courts, determinations of bank regulators, and the Guidelines of
the Justice Department regarding the manner in which the antitrust laws will be applied to acquisitions of banks in Illinois accomplished pursuant to the 1981 Act.
The impact of a proposed acquisition on competition will be
tested against a local geographical market. The State of Illinois
will not be viewed as the relevant market, and it is highly unlikely
that the five regions designated in the 1981 Act will give content to
the geographical market definition. The fact that companies will be
limited to acquiring banks located in their home and not more
than one contiguous region, however, probably will result in a relatively large percentage of acquisitions of banks in Illinois tested as
direct rather than potential competition cases. The size of the relevant geographic market will probably vary with the size of the constituent banking entities, the composition of their customer base,
and the urban, suburban, or rural nature of their local and surrounding communities. The Board and Justice Department will
probably view a market in which the shares of the four largest
banking entities total seventy-five percent or more to be a highly
concentrated market in which acquisitions will be very closely
scrutinized.
Unless and until the Supreme Court overrules its earlier decisions on the matter, commercial banking will probably be deemed
the relevant product market, and the Board will undoubtedly require that the market-share statistics furnished to it regarding a
proposed acquisition reflect commercial banking as the product
market. In markets where it can be shown statistically that thrifts
are a genuine competitive presence, however, the Board will probably consider competition from thrifts as a factor tending to reduce
the anticompetitive effects of a proposed acquisition..
Finally, the Illinois restrictions on holding company expansion
through acquisition of de novo or recently-chartered banks, and
the restrictions on branch banking and limited service facilities
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should prove to be important factors (i) limiting the application of
potential competition as a ground for denial of applications, and
(ii) reducing the likelihood that a banking institution which is a
major competitor in the relevant market will be prevented from
establishing additional locations in other geographical areas of that
market through acquisitions of small banks with insignificant market shares.
CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGE TO THE

1981

ACT

On September 1, 1981, three small banks in Illinois filed a complaint in the Circuit Court of Sangamon County against the Illinois
Commissioner of Banks and Trust Companies seeking a declaratory judgment that the 1981 Act was enacted in violation of the
Illinois Constitution." 5 More specifically, the plaintiffs contend
that the provisions of the 1981 Act permitting multibank holding
companies and an additional limited service facility authorize
branch banking and that the 1981 Act was not adopted by the necessary vote required by the Constitution for adoption of branch
banking legislation. 176 With regard to the provision authorizing
multibank holding companies, although the plaintiffs concede that
multibank holding companies do not constitute branch banking
per se, they argue that because the banks in a holding company
system can be operated in a unitary manner constituting de facto
branch banking, the Act authorizes branch banking. The plaintiffs
further contend that the 1981 Act unlawfully delegates to the Federal Reserve Board power to decide whether a bank holding company seeking Board approval to acquire an additional bank will, if
granted approval, operate any of the subsidiary banks in its holding company system as de facto branch banks in violation of Illinois law. In addition, they contend that various references in the
1981 Act to the Federal Bank Holding Company Act and actions of
the Federal Reserve Board thereunder amount to an unlawful general delegation of legislative power by the Illinois General Assembly to the Congress of the United States and the Federal Reserve
Board. The Commissioner and the intervening codefendant, The
Association for Modern Banking in Illinois, contend that even if
175. McHenry State Bank, et al. v. William C. Harris, Commissioner, Docket No. 81CH-279 (Sept. 1, 1981).
176. Article XIII, Section Eight, of the Illinois Constitution provides: "Branch banking
shall be authorized only by law approved by three-fifths of the members voting on the question or a majority of the members elected, whichever is greater, in each house of the General
Assembly." ILL. CONsT. art. XIII, § 8.
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the 1981 Act can be construed to authorize branch banking, the
statute was adopted by the extraordinary constitutional majority
necessary for enactment of branch banking legislation.17 7 The defendants further contend that neither the provision permitting
multibank holding companies nor that permitting an additional
limited service facility authorizes branch banking within the meaning of the Illinois Constitution. They argue that whether or not
Illinois branch banking laws are effectively enforced at the Federal
Reserve level, if a multibank holding company system in fact engages in de facto branch banking, the Commissioner, Illinois Attorney General and affected competitors have adequate recourse to
the courts. Moreover, they suggest that the references to the Federal Bank Holding Company Act and the Federal Reserve Board
merely recognize federal powers already reserved under the United
States Constitution and federal statutes and such federal powers
would not be different even if the 1981 Act omitted all reference to
them.
On December 28, 1981, the Circuit Court dismissed the complaint. The plaintiffs were granted leave to appeal directly to the
Supreme Court of Illinois. The case was argued before the Supreme Court on January 27, 1982. At the time of this writing, the
Supreme Court has not rendered a decision on appeal.
CONCLUSION

By authorizing bank holding companies to acquire multiple bank
subsidiaries in Illinois, the 1981 Act narrows the Illinois banking
industry's handicap vis-a-vis Illinois savings and loan, credit
union, and finance company competitors in the offering of multilocational financial services. The handicap, however, is by no means
eliminated. First, branch banking continues to be prohibited in Illinois. Second, the 1981 Act imposes geographic limits on holding
company expansion and prohibits holding companies from expanding de novo or through acquisitions of recently-chartered
banks.
The provisions of the 1981 Act circumscribing holding company
expansion are complex and in some respects ambiguous. The ambiguities may offer opportunities for holding company acquisition of
177. The issue regarding the General Assembly's vote is whether a legislator answering
"present" is deemed to have cast a vote or abstained. If an answer of "present" is a vote, the
1981 Act failed to receive the extraordinary majority required by the Illinois Constitution; if
it is an abstention, the constitutional voting requirement was satisfied.
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noncommercial banks, free from geographic and de novo expansion
restrictions, and may afford a brief "window period" for geographically limited de novo expansion through, acquisition of de novo
banks caused to be chartered prior to January 1, 1982.
The ambiguities pose several problems for lawyers attempting to
structure holding company acquisitions of banks in Illinois. In situations in which a bank eligible to be acquired under the Act is
rechartered by reason of a charter conversion, acquisition by phantom bank merger or phantom bank restructuring into holding company form, the courts and regulators should, through a "tacking"
approach, view the rechartered bank as a continuation of the predecessor eligible bank. In many, but not all, cases, resourceful lawyers will be able to avoid this issue by structuring phantom bank
acquisitions so that they do not result in a rechartering of the acquired bank.
Antitrust considerations will significantly affect the contours of
holding company expansion in Illinois. In assessing the possible
anticompetitive effects of proposed acquisitions, the bank regulators, Justice Department, and courts can be expected to apply
traditional Clayton Act standards already extensively interpreted
in the banking context by the United States Supreme Court. The
structure of the banking industry in Illinois and the statutory limitations which will shape the continuing evolution of that structure
will undoubtedly play a major role in the application of antitrust
principles to proposed acquisitions of banks in Illinois.
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